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Chapter 3
TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND ADVICE

I. CLIENT CONFLICTS
Circular 230 §§ 10.20 and 10.29
Tax Court Rule 24(g) (Appendix F)
Model Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, and 1.13(a)

AICPA Code of Professional Conduct ET § 1.100.001 and Interpretation 1.110
(Appendix H)

A. Introduction
The point of conflicts of interest rules is to protect clients' reasonable
expectations that legal advisors and representatives will act on their behalf free
from compromising loyalties and influences. Thus, the basic principle embodied in
the Model Rules' conflict provisions is that a lawyer may not represent anyone
where the interests of another person-a current or former client, perhaps, or the
lawyer's own interests-could impair the lawyer's ability to zealously and
impartially act on a client's behalf. Resolution of a conflict might entail declining to
undertake representation, withdrawing from an existing representation, or
obtaining a client or clients' written consent to proceed despite a conflict.
Model Rule 1.7 sets out the general conflicts of interest principles on which all
other conflicts rules rely. Model Rule 1.7(a) provides that a lawyer may not
represent a client if that representation involves a concurrent conflict, meaning
that either:
1. the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client,
or
2. there is a significant risk that representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
former client, or a third person, or by the lawyer's own personal interest.
Notwithstanding a concurrent conflict, however, Model Rule 1.7(b) permits a
lawyer to represent a client if:
1. the lawyer believes that she will be able to competently and diligently
represent each affected client,
2. the representation is not prohibited by law,
3. the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or
other proceeding, and
99
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4. each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
AICPA conflicts of interest rules are set forth at AICPA Code of Professional
Conduct ET section 1.100.001 and Interpretation 1.110, which are reproduced at
Appendix H. Conflicts of interest for accountants are defined in terms of
relationships that could be viewed by a client, employer, or another party as
impairing a CPA's objectivity. If a CPA believes that a professional service can be
performed with objectivity, however, and the relationship is disclosed to and
consent is obtained from the client, employer, or other appropriate party, then the
CPA is permitted to perform the professional service. Conflicts cannot be waived
with respect to engagements that require independence, e.g., audits, reviews, and
other attest services.

B. Differences Among the Guiding Principles
Circular 230 also includes conflicts of interest rules in section 10.29. While it
follows from Ridgely u Lew, discussed in Chapter 2, that OPR does not have
authority to apply these rules to tax return preparation activity, the conflicts rules
may apply in other contexts. Section 10.29's provisions are very similar to those in
Model Ru1e 1.7.1 Circular 230 § 10.29, however, imposes three additional
requirements. First, while both the Model Rules and Circular 230 require that
conflict waivers be confirmed in writing, Circular 230 mandates that confirmation
be obtained within a reasonable period of time, but in no event later than 30 days
after the client has consented to the representation. Second, unlike Model Rule 1.7,
which permits affected clients to provide informed consent verbally if the consent
is contemporaneously documented by the practitioner in writing, a verbal consent
followed by a confirmatory letter authored by the practitioner will not satisfy
Circular 230 § 10.29 unless the confirmatory letter is countersigned by the client.
Finally, under Circular 230, practitioners are required to retain copies of written
consents for at least 36 months from the date on which representation of the client
concludes. While AICPA standards do not require written consent, they do state
that members should abide by Circular 230's more restrictive requirements
concerning written consent when practicing before the IRS. AI CPA Code of Prof'l
Conduct Interpretation 1.110.010.18.
Practitioners must provide copies of written consents to IRS officers or
employees, including those from OPR, upon request. Although the requirement to
turn over copies of written consents is explicitly stated in Circular 230 § 10.29(c), it
is consistent with the practitioner's duty, as a general matter under Circular 230
§ 10.20, to provide documents and information to the IRS upon proper and lawful
request. Unlike Circular 230 § 10.29(c), however, Circular 230 § 10.20 explicitly
provides that information and documents need not be turned over if the
practitioner believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the records or
information are privileged. Perhaps the very fact that Circular 230 § 10.29 requires
that written consents be obtained and held for 36 months should the IRS or OPR
1
Ai3 a practical matter, this may mean that attorneys are better than other tax professionals at
identifying and resolving conflicts of interest because attorneys generally are accustomed to the rules
and procedures. Jeremiah Coder, Recusal Not Always Required In Conjlicts, Hawkins Says, 139 TAX
NarEs 35 (2013).
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request them is meant to negate privilege as to such written consents because
there could be no realistic expectation of privacy. Of course, this argument
presumes that the client understands at the time of signing that the consent must
be turned over by the practitioner to the IRS upon request. It is the client's
expectation of privacy, and not the attorney's or tax adviser's, that matters for
privilege purposes.
Alternatively, it is possible that OPR regards written consents as ineligible for
protection by the attorney-client or Section 7525 privilege in the first instance.
Such a position may often be incorrect, particularly if a written consent document
includes or reflects privileged communications. Therefore, when a practitioner
chooses to explain the nature of a conflict to her client in writing, it would be
prudent to have the client consent, or confirm consent, in a separate document,
which could be turned over to the IRS or OPR without worry. It is generally
understood that OPR considers failure to obtain, retain, or turn over a written
consent a violation of Circular 230 regardless of the quality of the underlying
representation. 2
Practitioners representing clients in Tax Court proceedings must comply with
the Tax Court's own rule on conflicts of interest: 3 Tax Court Rule 24(g) provides
that if any counsel of record "represents more than one person with differing
interests with respect to any issue in the case," she must secure the clients'
informed consent to the representation, withdraw from the case, or take whatever
other steps are necessary to obviate the conflict of interest. Tax Court Rule 24(g)
imposes the same obligations on any counsel who "was involved in planning or
promoting a transaction or operating an entity that is connected to any issue in a
case." Counsel who is a potential witness in a case must withdraw or take other
steps necessary to obviate a conflict; obtaining the client's informed consent is not
an option in this situation.

PROBLEM 3-1
X is the president and chief executive officer of Family-Run Corp., a small,
family-run business. Family-Run engages Practitioner to prepare tax returns for
the company, its officers, and its shareholders (all family members). As Practitioner
prepares Family-Run's return, there is a question as to whether a payment the
company made to X is a deductible payment of compensation or a nondeductible
distribution. Does Practitioner have a conflict of interest? If so, can it be cured, and
how?

2
At least one instance of OPR having disciplined an attorney who failed to disclose a conflict of
interest to his clients and obtain their written consent to continue the representation has been publicly
announced. See IR-2012-63 (June 22, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Office-ofProfessional-Responsibility-Censures-Attorney. The identity of the attorney, who was censured, was
separately disclosed. Ann. 2012-33, 2012-35 I.R.B. 325, 327 (Aug. 27, 2012).
3
Practitioners representing clients in Tax Court must comply with all of the Model Rules, which have
been adopted as rules of practice before the court. Tax Court Rule 201(a). Differences between the Model
Rules and the rules adopted by one's own state of admission or practice, therefore, should be carefully
monitored.
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PROBLEM 3-2
Q, A, and B, all individuals, are partners in LP, a limited partnership. Q is the
general partner. Q engages Practitioner to prepare LP's return (Form 1065) and
the partners' Schedules K-1. Practitioner is separately engaged by Q, A, and B to
prepare their individual income tax returns. While preparing LP's return,
Practitioner identifies an issue as to the meaning of a provision in the partnership
agreement that will affect the allocation of partnership items to the partners. This
provision could be interpreted to provide an allocation of certain tax benefits to Q,
to the detriment of A and B. Does Practitioner have a conflict of interest? If so, can
it be cured, and how?

PROBLEM 3-3
Jon and Michael were married for all of 2015. In June 2015, Michael initiated
divorce proceedings. In early 2016, Jon engages Practitioner to prepare the
couple's joint tax return for 2015. Not long after, Michael (through his attorney)
asks Practitioner to prepare his 2015 tax return as married filing separately. When
Practitioner informs Michael's attorney that he was already engaged by Jon to
prepare a joint return for the couple, the attorney informs Practitioner that
Michael has no intention of signing a joint return. Does Practitioner have a conflict
of interest? If so, can it be cured, and how?

PROBLEM 3-4
Accounting Firm offers to discuss with June Cash a package of ideas the Firm
says could significantly reduce June's taxes. Accounting Firm will share the
package with June, however, only if June pays Accounting Firm an upfront fee for
the information and June and her lawyer, Rocky, each enter into a confidentiality
agreement pursuant to which June and Rocky agree never to divulge the ideas in
the package. If Rocky signed the confidentiality agreement, would he have a
conflict of interest in representing other clients who could benefit from the id.eas
that Rocky might obtain from Accounting Firm but agreed not to disclose?

C. Business Planning
Most Corporate Tax classes begin with a study of the tax consequences of
corporate formation, "Section 351 exchanges." Inevitably, students are asked to
consider a hypothetical set of facts involving several unrelated persons who,
together, desire to incorporate a new entity, with each person transferring
previously-owned property, cash and/or services to the newly-formed entity in
exchange for stock and, perhaps, other property ("boot"). Students are routinely
asked to consider whether each transferor recognizes gain or loss, and what each
transferor's basis in her newly acquired stock and boot will be. On the corporate
side, students learn that the corporation itself recognizes no gain or loss on the
issuance of shares, and master the increasingly complicated rules governing a
corporation's basis in property received from transferors. Professors go to great
lengths to assist students in divining those situations in which nonrecognition is a
benefit and those in which it is not. Students brainstorm solutions to assist the
various players in, e.g., recognizing losses but not gains, preserving or protecting
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unrecognized losses, and maximizing corporate basis in depreciable assets.
Corresponding concepts are covered in Partnership Tax classes in connection with
formation of partnerships and limited liability companies.
What typically is omitted from such instruction, however, is an examination of
the ethical situation in which an attorney hired by all of the transferors finds
herself. While individuals entering into a new business venture might view their
interests as common, that is not necessarily so. 4 Particularly in the case of small
businesses founded by individuals, one attorney is often hired by the entire group
to handle the corporate formation.
If a lawyer agrees to accept representation, who is the client, the individual
transferors (separately or as a group), or the corporation that results from the
representation? Does the answer depend upon whether the attorney will continue
to work professionally with the corporation?

State Bar of Arizona Opinion No. 02-06
(Sept. 2002) 5
Summary
A lawyer may form a business entity for various individuals and be counsel only
for the yet-to-be-formed entity, if appropriate disclosures and consents occur.
Alternatively, a lawyer may represent all of the incorporators, collectively, with
appropriate disclosures.
Facts
Lawyer is a business law practitioner who currently represents several businessmen in various matters. The existing clients ask the lawyer to form a new entity
corporation for them and to be counsel only for the entity.
Questions Presented
1. May a lawyer represent a yet-to-be-formed entity during formation?
2. Can a lawyer represent the prospective entity without being deemed to also
represent the incorporators?
3. If so, what disclosures must the lawyer make to the constituents to clarify who
is the client?

* * *
4
Individuals who form businesses often have inconsistent non-tax objectives as well, for example,
voting control or veto power over certain acts, priority return on investments or security for loans.
Conflicts also may present themselves in choosing the form of entity (corporation, partnership, limited
liability company), establishing rules for internal governance, structuring financing, agreeing on how to
resolve disputes and negotiating exit strategies.

5

Used with State Bar of Arizona permission.
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Opinion
1. Can a lawyer represent an entity that does not yet exist?
Yes, as long as the incorporators understand that they are retaining counsel on
behalf of the yet-to-be-formed entity and will need to ratify this corporate action,
nunc pro tunc, once the entity is formed. According to [Rule] 1.13(a), a lawyer may
represent an "organization." The Comments to the Rule explain that an "organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors,
employees, shareholders and other constituents. . . . The duties defined in this
comment apply equally to unincorporated associations."

An "organizational client" or "entity" can be a separate client. For purposes of
the ethical analysis, this Opinion will refer to "corporations" as the entity at issue,
but the analysis also is applicable to other legal entities.
To determine whether a lawyer ethically may represent a yet-to-be-formed
corporation, the analysis must include a review of Arizona corporate and partnership statutes. A.R.S. § 10-203 provides:
A. Unless a delayed effective date is specified in the articles of incorporation, incorporation occurs and the corporate existence begins when the
articles of incorporation and certificate of disclosure are delivered to the
commission for filing.
Under this statute, a corporation does not exist as a separate legal entity until its
articles of incorporation are filed with the Corporation Commission. 6 Section 10-204
of the Arizona Revised Statutes further cautions that individuals who attempt to
transact business as a corporation, knowing that no corporation exists, will be
jointly liable for their actions. Presumably, however, a newly formed corporation
may ratify pre-incorporation acts of the corporation, nunc pro tunc.
A decision from Wisconsin specifically holds that a lawyer hired to form an entity
can represent" the to-be-formed entity, not the incorporators, and the "~ntity" rule
applies retroactively. Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. 1992). This view would
be consistent with the "entity" theory of representation, under [Rule] 1.13(a). The
"entity" theory holds that a lawyer may represent the corporation and does not,
necessarily, represent any of the constituents that act on behalf of the entity-even
if it is a closely held corporation. See, e.g., Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England &
Whitfield, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. App. 1991); Bowen v. Smith, 838 P.2d 186 (Wyo.
1992).

An alternative view is the '1aggregate" theory in which the lawyer is found to
represent the incorporators/constituents collectively as joint clients. See Griva v.
Davison, 637 A.2d 830 (D.C. 1994). Under the aggregate theory, a lawyer
represents multiple co-clients during formation of the corporation and then once the
entity is formed, the clients must determine whether the lawyer will continue to
6
[1] Partnerships, however, are not required to make a filing to establish their existence; a
partnership exists once there is an "association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners [of] a
business for profit ... whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership." A.R.S. § 29-1013.A.
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represent all of the constituents and the entity, or just the entity. Who a lawyer may
represent depends upon whether the lawyer's independent professional judgment
would be materially limited because of the lawyer's duties to another client or third
person. See [Rule] 1.7(b); Matter of Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 876 P.2d 548 (1994). As
discussed below in Section 3, there are specific disclosures that a lawyer must make
to co-clients, in order for them to consent to a joint representation.
Thus, a lawyer may represent an entity during the formation process, as long as
the constituents who are acting on behalf of the yet-to-be-formed entity understand
and agree to the entity being the client.
2. Can a lawyer represent only the yet-to-be-formed entity and not the
constituents?
Who a lawyer represents depends upon the reasonable perceptions of those who
have consulted with the lawyer. In re Petrie, 154 Ariz. 295 (1987). When two or more
individuals consult with a lawyer about forming an entity, it is the responsibility of
the lawyer at that initial meeting to clarify who the lawyer will represent. [Rule]
1.13 provides that a lawyer may represent an entity and the Rule suggests that the
lawyer will not automatically be considered counsel for the constituents because
paragraph (e) of the Rule provides:
A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its
directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of [Rule] 1.7. If the organization's consent to
the dual representation is required by [Rule] 1.7, the consent shall be given
by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who
is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
In Samaritan v. Goodfarb, 176 Ariz. 497, 508, 862 P.2d 870 (1993), the Arizona
Supreme Court confirmed that a lawyer representing an entity does not automatically represent the constituents. Therefore, unless a lawyer wants to be counsel to
all of the incorporators and the entity, the lawyer should specify that the lawyer
does not represent the constituents collectively-the lawyer only represents the
entity. If an engagement letter or oral representation by the lawyer suggests that
the constituents are represented as an aggregate, then the lawyer will have ethical
obligations to each constituent. Aggregate representation also is ethically proper if
the disclosure to each client includes an explanation that the lawyer may have to
withdraw from representing each client if a conflict arises among the clients.
3. What disclosures should a lawyer make to the incorporating constituents to
obtain their informed consent to the limited representation of the entity?
The underlying premise of the conflict Rules is loyalty to clients. Where a
lawyer's independent professional judgment for a client is materially limited due to
anything or anyone, a conflict may exist. Thus, in order to avoid inadvertent conflicts
caused by misunderstandings of constituents in corporate representations, it is
crucial for lawyers to specify exactly who they represent, who they do not
represent, and how information conveyed to the lawyer by constituents of an entity
client will be treated, for confidentiality purposes. The Restatement Third, The Law
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Governing Lawyers, Comment b to§ 14 provides in part: ''A lawyer may be held to
responsibility of representation when the client reasonably relies on the existence
of the relationship. . . . "
See also Comment f: "[A] lawyer's failure to clarify whom the lawyer represents
in circumstances calling for such a result might lead a lawyer to have entered into
client-lawyer representations not intended by the lawyer."
Therefore, it is crucial that a lawyer specify in the engagement agreement if the
lawyer is not representing the constituents of an entity client.
Even if the engagement letter specifies that the constituents are not clients,
lawyers still should regularly caution constituents that they are not clientsparticularly when they consult with counsel. Lawyers who represent entities also
must be aware of the entity's potential fiduciary duties to the constituents, so that
the lawyer does not run afoul of those statutory or common law obligations. For
instance, there are cases that have held that lawyers may have fiduciary duties to
non-clients, depending upon whether the entity represented had fiduciary duties to
the third parties. See Fickett u Superior Ct. of Pima Cty., 27 Ariz. App. 793, 558 P.2d
988 (1976); Matter of Estate of Shano, 177 Ariz. 550, 869 P.2d 1203 (App. 1993)
(lawyer disqualified as counsel to administrator for an estate because of prior
representation of one beneficiary and derivative duty of neutrality to all
beneficiaries). Accordingly, lawyers for entities should be mindful of this potential
responsibility and that a derivative fiduciary duty to constituents may cause a
conflict of interest for the lawyer.
The engagement letter also should explain that once the entity is created, the
constituents agree to ratify the lawyer's services, nunc pro tunc on behalf of the
entity.
With respect to confidentiality obligations, lawyers should specify how information conveyed to the lawyer will be treated for confidentiality purposes. If the firm
is representing only the entity, constituents must be advised that their communications to the lawyer will be conveyed to the other decision-makers for the entity
and are not confidential as to the entity. The information is confidential, however,
according to Rule 1.6(a), to the "outside world." Similarly, information shared by
one co-client that is necessary for the representation of the other joint clients will
be shared with the other co-clients because there is no individual confidentiality
when a joint representation exists.
Finally, if the lawyer has chosen to represent multiple clients, including the
constituents and the entity, the lawyer should explain, at the beginning of the joint
representation, that in the event that a conflict arises among the clients, the lawyer
most likely will need to withdraw from representing all of the co-clients. However,
some commentators, including the Restatement Third, note that the engagement
agreement may provide that in the event of a conflict, the lawyer may withdraw
from representing one of the co-clients and continue to represent the remaining
clients. The usefulness of such provisions was recently demonstrated in In re Rite
Aid Corp. Securities Litigation v. Grass, 139 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Pa. April 17,
2001), where the court permitted the law firm to withdraw as counsel for one of the
executives of Rite Aid and continue as counsel for the entity in a class action suit,
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primarily because the engagement agreement provided for such action.

In Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. 1992), a case referred to in the State
Bar of Arizona opinion, supra, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the client is
the corporation, not the corporation's constituents. This is referred to as "the entity
theory." The court stated:
We thus provide the following guideline: where (1) a person retains a lawyer
for the purpose of organizing an entity and (2) the lawyer's involvement
with that person is directly related to that incorporation and (3) such entity
is eventually incorporated, the entity rule applies retroactively such that
the lawyer's pre-incorporation involvement with the person is deemed to be
representation of the entity, not the person.
In essence, the retroactive application of the entity rule simply gives the
person who retained the lawyer the status of being a corporate constituent
during the period before actual incorporation, as long as actual incorporation eventually occurred.
ld. at 67. Under the "entity theory" of representation, a corporate lawyer typically
is not disqualified from representing the corporation in litigation between the
corporation and one or more of its constituents. It also means that the corporate
lawyer generally is not liable to shareholders, officers, or directors for malpractice
or breach of fiduciary duty. Moreover, as specifically noted by the court in Jesse v.
Danforth, the identity of the client has implications with respect to the attorneyclient privilege. The corporation, and not the constituents, holds the privilege as to
communications pertaining to the organization of the entity. Individual constituents
who are also being represented personally by the lawyer, however, hold the
privilege where a communication does not relate directly to the purpose of
organizing the entity.

If the lawyer's dealings with constituent individuals become so extensive and
personal that the individuals reasonably believe that the lawyer represents them
personally, a court or disciplinary authority might conclude that, despite the "entity
theory," a lawyer-client relationship has nonetheless been formed between the
lawyer and the individual constituent. Attorneys should be familiar with their own
states' corporate laws when evaluating possible conflicts of interest questions in the
context of business representation.
Samples of conflicts language for engagement letters often are available on the
websites of state bars. For example, the Georgia Bar website includes a lengthy
"Report on Engagement Letters in Transactional Practice," at http://
www.gabar.org/committeesprogramssections/sections/business/upload/eltp.pdf.
The Colorado state bar website also contains an interesting example, at
http://www.cobar.org/repository/LPM%20Dept/FeeAgmts/EngageLtrConfiictof
InterestASparkman.pdf?ID=260. The American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel offers samples, as well, at http://www.actec.org/publications/engagementletters/.
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PROBLEM 3-5
Three prospective clients meet with Lawyer to discuss a new business venture.
A, who has experience in the business, would contribute his management skills, B
would contribute a substantial amount of cash, and C would contribute assets that
could be used in the business. Each person would receive one-third of the stock in
a newly formed corporation. A, B, and C have asked Lawyer to create the
corporation and to advise them with respect to tax and other issues related to
forming and operating the business.
a. May Lawyer represent all three individuals seeking to form the business?
Whom should Lawyer represent in the case? How would you advise Lawyer to
proceed?
b. Would your answer to (a), above, change if A, B, and C brought in another
"partner," D, who would contribute property with an adjusted basis in excess of
value?
c. If a dispute were to arise among the three "partners," and one of them
decided to hire her own lawyer, could Lawyer continue to represent the remaining
"partners?"
d. Suppose that you accept the representation in full compliance with your
ethical obligations and that several years later, A calls you to discuss renegotiating
her salary. How should you handle her call?

PROBLEM 3-6
You recently filed a letter ruling request with the IRS on behalf of Smithco, Inc.
to the effect that a series of contemplated transactions should, with application of
the step transaction doctrine, be treated as a tax-free reorganization. Jonesco, Inc.
has asked you to represent it in Tax Court litigation in .which its position will be
that a similar series of transactions should not to be stepped together, but should
instead be treated as separate steps, with the result that there is no reorganization.
Can you take the case? Would your answer be different if you are representing
Smithco in Tax Court rather than in the ruling process? What is the answer if you
are representing Smithco in connection with an audit, after the transaction has
already been reported as a reorganization on a filed tax return? See Model Rule
1.7, Comment [24].

D. When Business or Personal Relationships Fail
Human nature being what it is, disputes often develop between or among
business "partners" once business operations have commenced. Whether a lawyer
previously worked with all of the co-venturers or merely represented the entity,
questions arise as to whether the attorney may continue in the representation and
whom the attorney may represent. Among the concerns is the possibility that the
attorney received confidential information that may not be used against a former
client. While the case below arose out of a personal, not a business, relationship,
the ethical considerations are well exemplified.

I.

CLIENT CONFLICTS

109

DEVORE v. COMMISSIONER
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
963 F.2d 280 (1992)
PER CURIAM:

Gary Devore appeals from the United States Tax Court's denials of his motions
to vacate deficiency judgments for the tax years 1970-1975. Devore contends that
dual representation of himself and his ex-wife in the tax proceedings resulted in a
conflict of interest that prevented their joint counsel from raising defenses on his
behalf. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7482(a), 7483. We reverse the orders
of the tax court and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether
Devore was prejudiced by his former counsel's conflict of interest and whether
Devore had reasonable grounds for failing to seek independent counsel.
Background
For many years, Maria Cole and her former husband, Nat King Cole, had been
represented by attorney Harry Margolis. Margolis continued to represent Maria
Cole after Nat King Cole's death. Maria Cole and Gary Devore were married in
1969. For the year 1970, Devore filed an individual return. Joint returns were
prepared for all other years during the marriage. Until June 1987, Harry Margolis
was the sole counsel of Cole and Devore. Leo Branton, Jr., became co-counsel with
Margolis in June 1987. Margolis died on or about July 15, 1987 and Branton became
the sole counsel of record on behalf of Cole and Devore in connection with the
instant actions. The tax proceedings culminated in the entry of two judgments
against Devore.
Cole and Devore were separated in 1976, and were divorced in 1978. The tax
court did not render judgments in the instant cases until 1989. Despite their
divorce, joint counsel continued to represent Cole and Devore throughout the tax
proceedings.
After a four day trial, the tax court determined that [for 1970] Devore was
individually liable for a federal tax deficiency of $135,302, and for a negligent return
penalty of $6,765. The tax court found that Devore failed to carry his burden of
proof in establishing that certain checks totaling $210,000 did not constitute
reportable income to him. 'l\vo checks had been issued to Devore by a company
controlled by Margolis. These checks were received by Devore, but were immediately endorsed over to Margolis. Devore alleges that these funds were then used to
purchase a home in the name of Maria Cole. The tax court found that the $210,000
represented by the two checks was income attributable to Devore.
In a second judgment entered pursuant to stipulations of settlement, Devore and
Cole were held jointly and severally liable for deficiencies totaling over $300,000 for
the years 1971-1975.
Devore states that he entered and left his marriage to Cole with a net worth of
less than $10,000 and that he lacks the money to satisfy the judgments. He further
states that he was unsophisticated in tax matters and that he was continually
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excluded from the financial affairs of Maria Cole.
Devore moved, through new counsel, to vacate the tax court's deficiency
judgments. He asserted that when counsel represented him and Cole jointly, a
conflict of interest resulted. This conflict, argues Devore, prevented joint counsel
from bringing innocent spouse and agency defenses which would have diminished
his tax liability. The tax court denied these motions.
Discussion
A tax court's decision not to reopen a record for the submission of new evidence
"is not subject to review except upon a demonstration of extraordinary circumstances which reveal a clear abuse of discretion." Nor-Cal Adjusters u Commissioner, 503 F.2d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1974).
The facts of Devore's case constitute "extraordinary circumstances." One spouse
was in a substantially weaker position with reference to the other. Devore earned a
negligible income while his wife controlled a significant sum of money. Devore was
unsophisticated in tax matters and was excluded from the financial affairs of his
wife.
Our research uncovered only one case that is directly on point. In Wilson u
Commissioner, 500 F.2d 645 (2nd Cir. 1974), a husband and wife had filed joint tax
returns. The husband earned a much larger income than his wife. A deficiency
judgment was entered against the couple. Throughout the tax proceedings, they
were jointly represented by the same attorney. However, they were also engaged in
a simultaneous annulment action. In the annulment action, the husband was
represented by the same attorney who represented the couple in the tax proceedings.
The Second Circuit held that it could "reverse a discretionary denial by the Tax
Court of post-opinion motions only if there are shown to be 'extraordinary
circumstances.'" Wilson[,] 500 F.2d at 648, quoting Pepi, Inc. u C.l.R., 448 F.2d 141,
148 (2nd Cir. 1971). The court held that the facts in Wilson were sufficiently
compelling to constitute "extraordinary circumstances.'' The attorney could not
competently advance the interests of the wife in the tax proceedings while
representing the husband in a separate annulment action. It thus reversed the tax
court's denial of Mrs. Wilson's post-opinion motions. It remanded the case to the tax
court, allowing Mrs. Wilson to present evidence explaining her failure to seek the
advice of independent counsel and to raise the annulment issue.
The facts supporting Devore's claim of "extraordinary circumstances" are at
least as compelling as those of Wilson. In Wilson, the attorney represented both the
husband and wife in tax proceedings while representing the husband in a
simultaneous annulment litigation. However, the couple was still married at the
time of the tax proceedings. In the instant case, the parties were separated in 1976
and divorced in 1978. The trial did not take place until 1989. By this time, the
marriage was clearly over. Arguably, Devore's interests were compromised by
counsel's simultaneous representation of Devore and Cole.
Accordingly, we remand to the tax court for an evidentiary hearing to determine
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if Devore was prejudiced by his former counsel's conflict of interest and to establish

the reasonableness of his failure to retain independent counsel. If Devore satisfies
these burdens, he should be granted a new trial at which innocent spouse and
agency defenses may be asserted.

The Devore case is somewhat unique in that the aggrieved spouse was the
ex-husband? Most often, innocent spouse claims are made by an ex-wife. Why?
What special responsibilities does this impose on a lawyer who perhaps has a
preexisting professional relationship with the ex-husband?
Many law firms are loathe to provide legal services at the same time to
individuals (e.g., estate planning) and business entities in which those individuals
own interests because disagreements often arise between or among the individuals,
creating painful conflicts of interest problems for lawyers. For an example of such
a conflict, see Pascale u Pascale, 549 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1988), infra, Section I.F.

PROBLEM 3-7
You have represented Mr. and Mrs. Mildew in connection with an audit of their
joint federal income tax return. Following the audit, the IRS issues them a joint
notice of deficiency. You prepare a petition, which they both sign, and which is then
filed in the Tax Court. 'I\vo weeks before the case is scheduled to go to trial, Mrs.
Mildew calls, says they are getting divorced and tells you that her divorce lawyer
has discovered that her husband was skimming cash receipts out of their jointly
owned restaurant without reporting them on the couple's tax returns. What are
your ethical and other obligations to each of the Mildews, IRS counsel, and the Tax
Court?

PROBLEM 3-8
Practitioner prepared a joint return filed by a married couple. The couple later
divorced. May Practitioner represent both spouses in connection with an IRS
challenge to expenses that were claimed on the joint return? Note that Section
6013(e) (innocent spouse relief provision that applied at the time Devore was
decided) has been replaced by Section 6015. Does your analysis change because of
the statutory change? What must Practitioner do if she decides to accept
representation?

7
A more recent case in which the "innocent spouse" was the husband isHarbin u Commissioner, 137
T.C. 93 (2011). A lawyer had represented both spouses at audit and in Tax Court litigation without raising
a viable innocent spouse claim. See Section 6015. He had also represented both spouses in a contentious
divorce during the pendency of the Tax Court proceedings! The husband clearly blamed his wife for their
tax problems, which resulted from her substantial gambling activities. The court found that the attorney
had a conflict of interest, which he had neither disclosed to the couple nor sought to have them waive. The
husband was later permitted to request innocent spouse relief.
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PROBLEM 3-9
Several years ago, before Husband married Wife, Lawyer represented Husband
in connection with the formation of a business venture. Recently, Wife approached
Lawyer to request representation in divorce proceedings against Husband. Can
Lawyer accept the representation? What are Lawyer's ethical obligations? See
Model Rule 1.9, Comment [3].

E. Tax Shelters
For many years, taxpayers and the IRS have litigated over the tax
consequences of transactions...that the IRS has labeled "tax shelters." For tax
benefits generated from a purported tax shelter transaction to be upheld, courts
have consistently held that the transaction or series of transactions at issue must
have economic substance. In an often-quoted articulation of the economic
substance doctrine, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated:
To treat a transaction as a sham, the court must find [1] that the taxpayer
was motivated by no business purposes other than obtaining tax benefits in
entering the transaction, and [2] that the transaction has no economic
substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists.
Rice's Toyota World u Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).

The Circuit Courts of Appeals that have considered the economic substance
doctrine agree generally on the articulation of its two parts as set forth in Rice's
Toyota, but differ on how to apply the test. Some circuits have required that a
transaction satisfy both the business purpose and economic profit standards to
validate a transaction (conjunctive test). Other circuits have required satisfaction of
only one of the standards to validate a transaction (disjunctive test). Some courts
have given more weight to one prong than the other, in some cases disregarding one
or the other of the two prongs altogether. In some cases, courts have considered
both prongs as merely factors, among others, in determining whether a transaction
has any practical economic effects other than the creation of tax benefits.
In 2010, Congress codified the economic substance doctrine for penalty purposes,
endorsing the conjunctive approach (i.e., a transaction has economic substance only
if it satisfies both parts of the test). Under Section 6662(b)(6), a 20 percent
accuracy-related penalty may be imposed on an understatement of tax resulting
from a transaction that lacked economic substance or failed to meet the requirements of any similar rule of law. The penalty increases to 40 percent if relevant facts
are not adequately disclosed on the taxpayer's return. Section 6662(i). For penalty
purposes, a transaction is treated as having economic substance only if:
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal
income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax
effects) for entering into such transaction.
Section 7701(o)(1). The potential for profit from a transaction is taken into account
in determining whether the requirements in (A) and (B) are met only if the present
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value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial
in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that would have been
allowed if the transaction had been respected. Section 7701(o)(2)(A).
The following problems exemplify conflicts of interest issues arising in the
context of the economic substance doctrine.

PROBLEM 3-10
Your law firm represents 18 different clients who invested in a transaction sold
by the same accounting firm. For each client, you must prove that the client had a
profit motive for investing in the transaction, which the IRS has called a tax
shelter. Can you offer the same profit motive for each client (e.g., expectation of a
specific return on a series of hedging transactions)?

PROBLEM 3-11
If profit motive or business purpose is an essential element of proof to obtain a
deduction from a tax shelter investment, does representation of multiple clients
who invested in essentially the same transaction (1) dilute any single client's
chances of obtaining a favorable settlement or (2) impose ethical constraints on the
lawyer when additional clients are added to the representation roster?

PROBLEM 3-12
With the informed consent of the parties, your law firm has undertaken
representation of investors in a tax shelter in proceedings before the Tax Court in
which the tax benefits of the shelter are being challenged. During the pendency of
the proceeding, a separate class action is brought against the shelter promoters on
behalf of a putative class consisting of the investors in the shelter, including some
of your firm's clients. Your firm does not anticipate participating as counsel in the
class action on behalf of either side. Can your firm continue in the Tax Court
representation? See D.C. Opinion No. 165 (Jan. 21, 1986). Would it matter whether
the promoters have agreed to pay all of your professional fees incurred by the
investors in the Tax Court proceeding?

PROBLEM 3-13
An accounting firm developed and promoted a tax shelter in which your firm's
client invested. Can your firm represent that client at the same time that it
represents the accounting firm in malpractice cases that do not involve tax
shelters? Can your firm represent that client at the same time that it represents
the accounting firm in malpractice cases that do involve tax shelters?

PROBLEM 3-14
Your law firm's banking department does loan documentation work for a bank
that provided financing for a tax shelter transaction. A tax department client
invested in one such tax shelter transaction. Can the firm represent both the bank
and the investor?
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PROBLEM 3-15
Your law firm represents a large insurance company on general corporate and
regulatory matters. The insurance company sold a transaction, which the IRS
alleges is substantially similar to a listed transaction but which the insurance
company claims was substantially different from the listed transaction, to Investor.
Can you represent Investor in connection with an IRS audit?

F. Estate Planning
Conflicts of interest generally arise in estate planning in one of four situations.
1. Spouses. First, and most commonly thought of, are conflicts involving
concurrent representation of spouses. (Many, but not all, of the same issues arise,
as well, when representing unmarried cohabitants.) Children from prior marriages
or large disparities in wealth between spouses might be a reason to suggest
separate representation. Spouses of substantially different ages may have conflicts
in their planning goals. In addition, when one spouse dies, the surviving spouse and
the estate could have differing interests. For example, the surviving spouse may
wish to make an election against the estate or the executor may wish to make an
election that increases the surviving spouse's share of the estate while decreasing
the interests of other beneficiaries.

Nonetheless, and despite all of the possible conflicts, spouses frequently visit
attorneys together for the purpose of preparing their wills. Often, these are
reciprocal wills-wills that are essentially mirror images of each other, in which
each spouse leaves his or her residuary estate to the other. Under Model Rule 1.7,
a lawyer should, in most cases, be able to represent and plan for both spouses
jointly. However, the lawyer should require each spouse to sign a written waiver of
confidentiality as to the other so that any information provided to the lawyer by
either spouse must be revealed to the other spouse. All information provided to the
lawyer, of course, would still be protected against disclosure to third parties. The
reluctance of a spouse to sign a waiver should alert the lawyer to the possible
existence of a nonwaivable conflict of interest.
The lawyer must explain to both spouses that their interests could conflict,
particularly where they do not agree on the identity of beneficiaries or fiduciaries.
Under Model Rule 1.7, each spouse must sign this statement, agreeing to allow the
lawyer to use his or her best efforts and judgment to represent each of them,
despite these possible conflicts. It would be wise for the lawyer and spouses to
agree that both spouses must be present whenever either wishes to change any of
his or her estate planning documents.
The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel offers samples of conflicts
language for engagement letters in estate planning, at http://www.actec.org/
publications/engagement-letters/. The Colorado Bar Association web site also
contains a good example, at https://www.cobar.org/repository/Inside_Bar/
TrustEstate/OrangeBook_Dec2007_EngagementLetter.pdf?ID =2841.
2. Families. Second, conflicts may arise where parents and children seek
representation or advice. A parent and child might have different ideas about the
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use or disposition of a trust fund benefitting the child, or an adult child and an infirm
parent might disagree about transfers of the parent's property. Conflicts also often
arise when adult children are involved in a family-owned business, which forms a
substantial portion of a parent's estate.
Particularly where the lawyer is approached by an adult child or children in
connection with estate planning for a parent, care should be given to the question
of who is the client - the adult child(ren) or the parent? Surprisingly, intentions in
this regard are often unclear: is the purpose of the representation to plan for the
disposition of the parent's assets as he or she intends or to protect the interests of
a particular beneficiary? If the attorney previously represented either the parent or
the child, the attorney might possess confidential information, gained through the
course of that representation that would be inconsistent with representing the
other.8
Once it is determined who the client is, it is important to make sure that everyone
understands and agrees. Even where such an understanding is reached, however,
maintaining confidentiality between lawyer and client often presents challenges.
For example, elderly clients may feel more comfortable meeting with the lawyer in
the company of their children. Significant decisions are made at these meetings and
it is the attorneys responsibility to establish a clear and confidential line of
communication without the presence or undue influence of family members.
Attorneys are strongly advised to talk to the client alone to make sure that
problems of conflicts of interest and undue influence do not exist, and to explain
confidentiality concerns.
3. Businesses and their Constituents. Third, a conflict may arise when a lawyer
represents a business entity and a majority or controlling owner, as was discussed
earlier in this chapter. Additional issues arise where business and estate planning
overlap. For example, an estate plan of a majority shareholder of a closely-held
corporation could affect the business plans or ownership of the corporation as well
as the relationship between the corporation and other shareholders.

PASCALE v. PASCALE
New Jersey Supreme Court
549 A.2d 782 (1988)
PoLLOCK,

J.

Plaintiff, John J. Pascale (Pascale), seeks to set aside a transfer of stock and real
estate to his son David P. Pascale (David). Pascale contends that a confidential
relationship existed between him and David and that the same attorney advised
both of them in connection with the transfer. The issue is whether the transfers are
invalid because David exercised undue influence over Pascale.

* * *
8

Moreover, if the parent is incapacitated or appears to suffer from a diminished capacity, particular
issues pertaining to such a representation must be considered. Discussion of such matters is beyond the
scope of this book. See Model Rule 1.14.
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Nearly fifty years ago, in 1939, Pascale founded a machine tool and die business,
which was later incorporated under the name Quality Tool & Die Company Inc.
(Quality). In 1952, plaintiff established a second, smaller machine tool company,
Majoda Tool and Die Company (Majoda), which operated out of Quality's premises
in Hoboken. By 1960, both businesses had become quite profitable.
In the 1960s, Pascale introduced his older son, John, Jr., into the businesses, and
six years later, Pascale gave all the stock in Majoda to John, Jr. David began
full-time employment with Quality in 1971. Sometime before 1972, John, Jr. left
Majoda and assigned all of his stock to Pascale and David.
In March 1972, Pascale's wife instituted a divorce action, and the two sons chose
sides: John, Jr. sided with his mother, and David with Pascale. Consequently,
Pascale did not see John, Jr. again until their apparent reconciliation in 1978. In
1973, to minimize his net worth and thereby to reduce his wife's share in an
equitable distribution of his assets, Pascale signed a stock certificate, which
purported to transfer ownership of his Quality shares to David. The certificate,
however, was backdated to 1968, four years before the institution of the divorce
action.
Initially, the fraud worked. An accounting firm, which was appointed by the
matrimonial court to investigate Pascale's assets, reported on June 7, 1973, that
Pascale was "essentially responsible" for the operations of Quality and Majoda, but
that he had transferred his stock in both corporations to David on October 16, 1968.
The matrimonial court approved the property settlement based on this false
information. Although Pascale claims that the stock certificate and corporate books
are lost, David produced at the trial of the within matter a photocopy of a signed
copy of the backdated October 16, 1968, stock certificate.
Consistent with the certificate, David claimed in his deposition that Pascale
transferred all the Quality stock to him in 1968. David denied that any transfer of
stock from his father to him occurred between 1970 and 1976. When asked at trial
who owned the Quality stock in 1976, however, David testified, "my father did." The
foregoing facts led the trial court to find that Pascale signed the backdated
·certificate in 1973 as part of "a scheme to defraud [Pascale's] wife and the
matrimonial court."
Following the transfer, Pascale and David continued in their respective roles at
Quality. Unti11979, Pascale remained in control, with David managing accounts and
performing other office work. From 1971 until late 1981, Pascale and David enjoyed
a close personal relationship. Pascale lavished expensive gifts on David and his wife,
including cars, real estate, a sable coat, jewelry, and large amounts of cash. David
handled Pascale's personal financial affairs, such as check writing, personal bills,
safe deposit boxes, and securities.
Late in 1975, however, the Internal Revenue Service asserted a tax deficiency
claim against Pascale personally and also against Quality. On the advice of his
personal and business accountant, J. Bennett Schwartz, Pascale retained a tax
attorney, Bernard Berkowitz, who resolved the IRS matter in January 1979. In the
interim, Pascale asked Berkowitz to prepare an estate plan for him.
Early in his representation on both matters, Berkowitz communicated exclu-
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sively with Pascale. Pascale, however, directed Berkowitz to "deal directly with
David Pascale or Ben Schwartz, but primarily David." According to Berkowitz,
Pascale instructed him to develop an estate plan that left "everything to David"
while incurring as little tax liability as possible. David confirmed Berkowitz's
testimony by acknowledging that he served as an agent for Pascale in dealing with
Berkowitz.
As early as 1977, Berkowitz and his associate, Stephen C. Levitt, discussed with
David and Schwartz an estate plan that would have left Pascale in control of Quality.
For tax purposes, Berkowitz recommended that Pascale transfer to Quality land he
owned in Hoboken and that Pascale convert his common stock in Quality into three
classes: preferred stock, voting common stock, and nonvoting common stock. The
then-existing value of Quality would be ascribed to the preferred stock, which
Pascale would retain along with all the voting common stock. David would receive
the nonvoting common stock to which all future growth would be attributed.

In May 1978, Berkowitz worked out the details of the recapitalization with David
and Schwartz, who in turn informed Pascale of the plan. Although Pascale approved
the recapitalization, the plan was never executed.
A year later, on May 9, 1979, Berkowitz, Levitt, and Schwartz met with David. At
this meeting, while reading the 1973 accountant's report from the matrimonial
action, Berkowitz first learned that Pascale apparently had transferred the Quality
shares to David in 1968. It became apparent to Berkowitz that there was a conflict
between David and Pascale about the ownership of the Quality stock. As Berkowitz
testified, "David Pascale thought he owned the stock; John Pascale thought that he
owned the stock." Because the recapitalization plan was premised on Pascale's
ownership of the Quality stock, the confusion about stock ownership caused
Berkowitz to abandon this plan.
Berkowitz also ascertained that no gift tax had been paid on the backdated
transaction. Confronted with this information, Berkowitz devised an alternate plan
to fulfill Pascale's intention of leaving, with a minimal tax impact, all of his business
assets to David. The plan was for Pascale to give the Hoboken properties and the
Quality stock to David, with David paying the gift taxes of $54,947. That proposal
was consistent with the will prepared by a different attorney and executed by
Pascale on December 10, 1975, in which Pascale left his entire estate to David.
Berkowitz further believed that the gift to David would reduce the problems
inherent in the fraudulent matrimonial scheme, which was evidenced by the
backdated stock certificate.
The trial court found that Berkowitz discussed the alternate plan with David and
Schwartz, and that each of them in turn discussed it with Pascale. Both David and
Schwartz claimed that Pascale understood that by agreeing with this plan, he would
be yielding control of Quality to David. Indeed, Schwartz testified that he spoke
with Pascale on May 24, 1979, the day Pascale executed the alternate plan, and
specifically admonished him that by executing the plan, "he was giving the company
away, he could be thrown out in a week."
On that date, Berkowitz, David, and Pascale met at Pascale's office in Hoboken
to execute the plan. According to Levitt, with the exception of several letters that his

118

TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND ADVICE

CH.3

law firm had mailed to Pascale, this meeting was the first time since January 11,
1978, that the firm "had any contact or has any records that reflect any contact with
John Pascale." At the meeting, Pascale signed various documents, including two
stock certificates of Quality: one that described Pascale as the owner of 310 shares,
and the other that described David as the owner of 310 shares. Pascale also signed
an assignment transferring his 310 shares of Quality to David, a deed from Pascale
and Quality conveying the Quality premises in Hoboken to David, and an affidavit
· of consideration.
The main dispute in this case is whether Pascale understood that these
documents effected an outright transfer of the Quality stock and real estate to
David. On this point, as on others, the testimony at trial was in sharp conflict.
According to Pascale, before the May 24, 1979, meeting, he had not received any
of the documents. He contends that he had no opportunity to read the documents
before signing them, that neither Berkowitz nor David explained the documents to
him, and that he relied on them in signing the documents. Pascale testified that he
thought he ''was to have control [of Quality] to the day I died or was incapable of
handling the business."
David and Berkowitz testified, however, that Berkowitz reviewed the documents
in detail with Pascale before he signed them. Berkowitz did not remember whether
he discussed with Pascale the implications of transferring the Quality stock and the
Hoboken properties to David, but he believed that the implications were so obvious
that such a discussion was unnecessary. David, however, testified that Berkowitz
explained to Pascale that the effect of signing the documents would be to relinquish
control of Quality to David. Pascale signed the documents.
On the same day, David executed a will prepared by Berkowitz, in which David
bequeathed all his Quality stock to a testamentary stock trust, of which Pascale was
the trustee. The beneficiaries of the trust were Pascale and David's wife, and all
income was payable to Pascale during his lifetime. In the following year, on October
7, 1980, however, David executed another will, which eliminated the trust and
provided that the Quality stock and land would pass to his wife, if she survived, and
if she predeceased him, to his mother-in-law.
Mter the May 24, 1979, meeting, David assumed greater responsibility in
managing Quality. Pascale remained active in the business, and continued to receive
his $3,500 weekly salary, plus approximately $700 in travel and entertainment
expenses. In January 1980, however, David attempted to reduce Pascale's salary to
$3,000 per week, but Pascale responded by retroactively reinstating his salary to
$3,500.
Relations between David and Pascale cooled when David learned that Pascale
was helping John, Jr. in a competing machine and tool business. According to
Pascale, he first learned that he was no longer in control of Quality in October 1981
following a dispute with David over Pascale's assistance to John, Jr. David ordered
Pascale to leave the Quality premises and to consult with a lawyer to confirm that
David now controlled Quality and had the right to terminate Pascale's employment.
Notwithstanding their dispute, Pascale remained on Quality's payroll until October
1982, two months after he filed the within action. In the interim, during the spring
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of 1982, Pascale consulted with Levitt, who told him that the effect of the May 24,
1979, transfers was to place David in control of Quality.

* * *
(T]he trial court found that Pascale's attorney, Berkowitz, was not in a position
of conflict when he prepared Pascale's estate plan and advised him to execute it,
stating, "[a]t all times Berkowitz was Pascale's rather than David's attorney."
The Appellate Division reversed. 216 N.J. Super. 133. It found that a confidential
relationship existed between Pascale and David, and that Berkowitz was in a
position of conflict when he advised Pascale to execute the transfers.

* * *
We now turn to the question of the conflict of interest on the part of the attorney,
Berkowitz, in representing both David and Pascale at the time of the challenged
transfer. Here, we also agree with the Appellate Division's assessment that
Berkowitz was in a position of conflict in representing both parties. Berkowitz and
his associate, Levitt, admitted that there was a conflict in the positions of David and
Pascale concerning the ownership of the Quality stock prior to May 24, 1979.
Moreover, David admitted Pascale was never informed of the services rendered by
Berkowitz in preparing David's estate plan. Despite the fact that David told
Berkowitz that he, not Pascale, owned the Quality stock on May 9, 1979, Berkowitz
simultaneously represented David and Pascale. Neither Berkowitz nor David ever
informed Pascale, however, of David's claim to the stock or that Berkowitz was now
representing David. Nonetheless, the trial court found that "[a]t all times Berkowitz
was Pascale's rather than David's attorney." The Appellate Division rejected that
finding and found that Berkowitz was in a position of conflict because of his
simultaneous representation of the parties. 216 N.J. Super. at 142. We agree.
As we have previously stated, "[a] lawyer cannot serve two masters in the same
subject matter if their interests are or may became [sic] actually or potentially in
conflict." In re Chase, 68 N.J. 392, 396 (1975). Disciplinary Rule 5-105(A), which was
in effect at the time of the transaction, like present Rule of Professional Conduct
1.7, prohibited a lawyer from accepting or continuing employment "if the exercise
of his professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by the acceptance of' or continuance of the employment.

A conflict arises when an attorney represents in separate matters multiple
clients who have adverse interests in at least one of those matters. "Developments
in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession," 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1244,
1296-1306 (1981). The attorney has divided loyalties that can prevent faithful
representation of both clients in the matter in which the conflict arises. Ibid. For
example, an attorney may not, without making appropriate disclosure, simultane. ously represent the testator and the beneficiaries of a will. Haynes, supra, 87 N.J.
at 181-85. Similarly, here, Berkowitz should not have represented Pascale on the
transfer of real estate and stock to David without disclosing that he was simultaneously representing David on an independent matter. Even if Berkowitz believed
he could adequately represent the interests of both Pascale and David, he failed to
comply with the requirement of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C) that he fully disclose the
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conflict.
Consequently, we agree with the Appellate Division that the conflicting claims to
ownership of the Quality stock placed Berkowitz in a position of conflict arising from
his dual representation of David and Pascale. On the same day, Berkowitz
represented Pascale in the transfer of substantial assets to David and also
represented David in the drafting and execution of his will. The conflicting claims of
stock ownership, as the Appellate Division found, "raised an immediate conflict
having the clear potential to raise in the mind of legal counsel the question as to
which of the two masters was to be served and protected." 216 N.J. Super. at 142.

4. Referrals. Finally, an attorney is often asked to recommend a particular bank,
trust company, or person to serve as a trustee or executor knowing that the
company or person will hire the attorney who drafted the will as attorney for the
estate. Because this situation potentially creates a conflict between the client and
the lawyer's own interest, it should be analyzed under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) and
Circular 230 § 10.29(a)(2).

Illinois State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 99-06
(Nov. 1999)9
Facts
An Illinois trust company has developed a lawyer/trust administrator program in
which licensed Illinois lawyers, who practice substantially in the area of estate
planning, enter into an agency relationship with the trust company. The agency
agreement provides that the lawyers will furnish trust administrator services for ·
trusts in which the trust company has been named trustee. The lawyers perform the
administrative services for the trust from their law offices and may continue to
render legal services to the clients in matters related to the trust or otherwise, for
which they bill separately. Once accepted as a trust administrator, the lawyers may
refer clients and other persons as potential customers for the trust company's
services. The lawyer will bill his clients for legal services in preparing trust
instruments and other documents. The trust company does not prepare the trust
documents or otherwise practice law.

Assets of the trusts are deposited with the trust company and administered by
the trust company's investment advisors or, at the option of the client, in
self-directed accounts. Services of the trust company personnel are paid from the
trust assets pursuant to an established fee schedule, and the lawyer/trust administrator is paid a fee by the trust company, again under a published fee schedule,

9
Reprinted with permission of the Illinois State Bar Association. Copyright by the ISBA, on the web
at www.isba.org. ISBA Advisory Opinions on Professional Conduct are prepared as an educational
service to members of the ISBA. While the opinions express the ISBA interpretation of the Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct and other relevant materials in response to a specific hypothesized fact situation,
they do not have the weight of law and should not be relied upon as a substitute for individualized legal
advice.
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from the fee paid to the trust company from the client's trust.
The lawyer/trust administrator acts as a conduit of information between the
trust company and its customers, directs payments from the trust, forwards
customer investment directives, and responds on behalf of the trust company to
customer inquiries. The lawyer/trust administrator offers no investment advice with
respect to the trusts. The lawyer's relationship with the trust company, his
compensation as trust administrator, and other relevant information are set out in
an extensive written disclosure and consent form which the client must sign as a
part of the trust agreement.
Inquiry is made as to whether the arrangement described violates any provision
of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Opinion
A variety of issues created by relationships involving lawyers, their clients and
fiduciary institutions have been considered by this Committee.
We have stated, for example, that a lawyer who is both a director and lawyer for
a bank may not insist that his client designate the bank as a fiduciary, even where
the relationship is disclosed to the client. See Opinion No. 90-02 (1990).
We have also opined that it is professionally improper for a lawyer employed by
an institution marketing revocable living trusts to prepare or review such documents for possible use by his clients. Such an arrangement, we felt, posed
significant conflict of interest problems that would prevent the lawyer from fairly
representing the consumer/client and acting in his best interests. In addition, the
lawyer violated Rule 5.5(b) by aiding the unauthorized practice of law by the
institution in connection with its preparation of the trust documents. See Opinion
No. 90-20 (1991).
Finally, we have held that the referral of clients to an investment advisor or
securities broker, whereby the referring lawyer is paid a fee from the funds being
managed for the client, may be permissible provided that appropriate disclosures
are made. See Opinion No. 97-04 (1998).
The Committee considers the arrangement outlined above sufficient to satisfy
the concerns expressed in our prior opinions, provided that appropriate safeguards
are employed to satisfy the rules regarding conflicts of interest.
Where a lawyer's representation of a client may be limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to a third person or by the lawyer's own interests, the lawyer may
undertake or continue the representation only if he reasonably believes that the
representation will not be adversely affected and the client consents after disclosure. Rule 1.7(b) states the general rule:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
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(2) the client consents after disclosure.
Here, the lawyer as an agent of the trust company is expected to develop
business for the trust company by recommending the trust company's services to
the lawyer's clients and others. Where the trust company is selected by the client,
the lawyer is paid a fee for his services as trust administrator by the trust company
based upon the fee for trust services paid by the client/customer. The lawyer
accordingly has an incentive to recommend the trust company's services over those
of a competing fiduciary. The relationship between the lawyer and the trust
company, and the compensation generated by that relationship, involve "responsibilities to a third person" and "the lawyer's own interests," as described in the rule.
Nonetheless, the lawyer may, in the Committee's judgment, reasonably believe
that his representation of the client may not be adversely affected by his
relationship with the trust company. Since the client may disagree, however, it is
incumbent upon the lawyer, pursuant to Rule 1.7(b) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, to disclose his relationship with the trust company, the fee arrangement
and method of calculation (including the source of payment to him), and all other
aspects of the relationship. Although the rule does not by its terms require that the
disclosure be in writing, the Committee has noted that that is the more prudent
practice.
In our Opinion No. 97-04, supra, the Committee had occasion to consider two
slightly different referral arrangements involving lawyers, their clients, and an
investment adviser and securities broker. In each case, the referring lawyer was
paid a portion of the management fee generated by the investment of the client's
funds. We pointed out that such an arrangement constituted a business transaction
with a client, governed by Rule 1.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which
provides:
Unless the client has consented after disclosure, a lawyer shall not enter
into a transaction with the client if:
(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer and
client have or may have conflicting interests therein; or
(2) the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer's professional
judgment therein for the protection of the client.
We stated that, under pertinent Illinois case law, a presumption of undue
influence arises where a lawyer benefits from a business transaction with a client.
The presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. Generally,
this requires a showing of full disclosure of all relevant information, a transaction
that was fair and reasonable, and that the client had the advice of independent
counsel, or the opportunity for such advice, before entering into the transaction. In
re Anderson, 52 Ill. 2d 202, 287 N.E.2d 682, 682 (1972); In re Schuyler, 91 Ill. 2d 6,
61 Ill. Dec. 540, 424 N.E.2d 1137 (1982); Franciscan Sisters Health Care u Dean, 95
Ill. 2d 452, 448 N.E.2d 872, 69 Ill. Dec. 960 (1982).
As in Opinion No. 97-04, the investment of the client's trust assets in the case at
hand is clearly a business transaction. The profits realized from the investment
program are the basis for the trust company's fees from which, in turn, the
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lawyer/trust administrator's fees are paid. As in Opinion No. 97-04, these fees are
not for legal services performed; they emanate from a business transaction in which
the lawyer and the client are jointly interested.
Since the amount of the lawyer/trust administrator's fee is affected by the
performance of the trust being administered, there is at least the potential for a
conflict of interest between the lawyer and his client. The client's objectives with
respect to the trust program may dictate a relatively conservative investment
approach, which may generate lesser fees to the trust administrator (and the trust
company) than would a more aggressive approach. Disclosure must therefore be
made and the client's consent obtained in the same manner as prescribed with
respect to Rule 1.7(b). It should also be remembered that a conflict of interest
problem, although initially addressed by appropriate disclosure and consent,
imposes a continuing duty on the part of the lawyer to make supplemental
disclosures as developing circumstances warrant.
For the reasons given, the Committee believes that the arrangement described
is not professionally improper.

Illinois' version of Rule 1.8(a) is based on the Model Code DR 5-104 rather than
the Model Rule. The case law relied on in the Opinion, however, is more or less
consistent with Model Rule 1.8(a): the transaction must be fair and reasonable to
the client, the lawyer must fully disclose all relevant information, and the client
must obtain the advice of independent counsel or have opportunity to obtain such
advice before entering into the transaction. Moreover, the Opinion notes that
prudent practice entails obtaining the client's written consent to the essential terms
of, and the lawyer's role in, the transaction, as is required by Model Rule 1.8(a). An
Oregon ethics opinion concludes that the type of referral arrangement described in
the Illinois opinion is per se unethical. The opinion, Oregon Formal Op. 2005-2
(revised June 2014), never mentions the possibility of a conflict of interest, and is
based solely on Oregon's version of Model Rule 7.2(b) and an Oregon-specific
addition to Model Rule 5.4, which states:
(e) A lawyer shall not refer a client to a nonlawyer with the understanding
that the lawyer will receive a fee, commission or anything of value in
exchange for the referral, but a lawyer may accept gifts in the ordinary
course of social or business hospitality.

PROBLEM 3-16
You are asked to do estate planning and will drafting for Beth, the majority
shareholder and CEO of Widgets, Inc. (a regular firm client), and Beth's wife,
Mary.
a. What must you initially advise Beth and Mary before agreeing to take on
their estate planning?
b. Assume that after having heard your initial advice, Beth and Mary still
prefer to have you handle all of their estate planning. They provide you with the
appropriate informed consent. What would that be?
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c. You do the planning and draft the wills which Beth and Mary execute, but
you notice that Widgets does not have a buy-sell agreement with Fred, the CFO of
Widgets, who is also the minority shareholder. What should you do now?
d. The buy-sell agreement is drafted to provide that on the occurrence of
certain events (death, divorce, or bankruptcy of a shareholder), the company will
buy back the shareholder's shares in the company, with the valuation determined on
a formula basis. When the agreement is ready, Beth offers to set up a meeting for
the two of you and Fred in order to get the agreement signed. At that meeting, you
ask how Widgets will fund the share repurchase, particularly in the case of Beth's
death. Beth says, "Don't worry. It won't be a problem." Fred is concerned, but
doesn't pursue the issue. Are you ready to let Beth and Fred sign the agreement?
e. The buy-sell agreement is signed. As you sit at your son's soccer game two
years later, you hear from another parent (who works for Widgets) that Beth has
been having an affair with Widgets' sales manager, Melody, for "months." What
should you do?
f. Mary calls you later that fall, notes that she and Beth are getting a divorce,
and asks you to draft a new will for her. Can you do this? Can your firm continue
to represent Widgets?

PROBLEM 3-17
Lawyer has represented Husband and Wife for many years in a range of
personal matters, including estate planning. Husband and Wile have substantial
individual assets, and they also own substantial jointly-held property. Recently,
Lawyer prepared new updated wills that Husband and Wife signed. Like their
previous wills, the new wills primarily benefit the surviving spouse for his or her
life, with beneficial disposition at the death of the survivor being made equally to
their children (none of whom were from a prior marriage).
Husband, Wife, and Lawyer have always shared all relevant asset and financial
information. Consistent with previous practice, Lawyer met with Husband and
Wife together to confer regarding the changes to be made in updating their wills.
Several months after the execution of the new wills, Husband confers separately
with Lawyer. Husband reveals to Lawyer that he has just executed a codicil
(prepared by another law firm) that makes a substantial beneficial disposition to a
woman with whom Husband has been having an extra-marital relationship.
Husband tells Lawyer that Wife does not know about the relationship or the new
codicil, as to which Husband asks Lawyer to advise him regarding Wife's rights of
election in the event she were to survive Husband. What are Lawyer's ethical
obligations?
Suppose that Lawyer tells Husband that Lawyer cannot advise him regarding
Wife's rights and that Lawyer is withdrawing from representation of both Husband
and Wife. What are Lawyer's obligations with respect to informing or not
informing Wife of the substance of Husband's revelation if Husband does not do so
himself? See Florida Bar Op. 95-4 (May 30, 1997, revised, June 23, 2009).
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PROBLEM 3-18
Your law firm regularly engages an appraisal firm to prepare appraisal reports
for use in family limited partnership transactions and as litigation support for
valuation issues. The appraisal firm did a valuation of corporate stock that was an
integral part of a tax shelter. Can you represent an investor in the tax shelter in
connection with an IRS audit or Tax Court litigation?

II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
Circular 230 §§ 10.27 and 10.29
Internal Revenue Manual~ 4.11.55.4.2 (Appendix I)
Model Rules 1.5, 1.7, and 1.8
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct ET § 1.510.001 and Interpretation
1.510.010 (Appendix J)
Among the circumstances described in the general rule governing conflicts of
interest, Model Rule 1.7, is one that bans a lawyer from representing a client if
there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by a
personal interest of the lawyer. Circular 230 § 10.29(a)(2) contains a similar rule.
Model Rule 1.8 identifies specific instances of such conflicts and prescribes rules and
procedures for dealing with them; in some instances, the client may waive a conflict
while, in others, representation is strictly prohibited. (Situations that are not
specifically addressed in Model Rule 1.8. remain subject to the more general
strictures of Model Rule 1.7.)

PROBLEM 3-19
Lawyer has a number of estate planning clients who could benefit from financial
planning advice. She is considering establishing a relationship with Financial
Planner, who would pay her a referral fee for each client she refers to him. Can
Lawyer accept the referral fee?
Suppose that Lawyer and Financial Planner wish to enter into a reciprocal
arrangement under which Lawyer would refer clients to Financial Planner for
financial planning services and Financial Planner would refer clients to Lawyer for
legal services. See Model Rule 7.2(b)(4); Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Bar
Associations Joint Opinion 2000-100 (May 2000); Supreme Court of Ohio Opinion
2000-1 (Feb. 11, 2000).

PROBLEM 3-20
Lawyer has provided tax and other legal advice to a limited liability company
(LLC) in a traditional fee-for-service relationship. LLC's business has grown over
time and its members believe that it should have a general counsel. They have
asked Lawyer to take on this responsibility, on a part-time basis. In lieu of fees for
this work, the LLC members have proposed to give Lawyer a 20 percent
ownership interest in LLC and a percentage of the company's profits, if any. If
Lawyer accepts this position, she would continue her private practice representing

126

TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND ADVICE

CH.3

other clients. Under what circumstances is Lawyer ethically permitted to enter
into the proposed arrangement?

A. Contingent Fees
Circular 230 § 10.27 contains a general rule barring unconscionable fees in
matters before the IRS. No guidance is provided on what unconscionability means
in this context; presumably, the principles in Model Rule 1.5 would govern. Under
Model Rule 1.5, factors considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include:
1. the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
2. the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
3. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
4. the amount involved and the results obtained;
5. the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
6. the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
7. the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and
8. whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Model Rule 1.5(c) permits contingent fee arrangements - except in domestic
relations and criminal matters - so long as they are documented in a writing
signed by the client and stating the method by which the fee will be calculated.
The AICPA prohibits contingent fee arrangements in connection with the
preparation of an original or amended tax return, or a claim for refund. AICPA
Code of Prof! Conduct ET section 1.510.001 (together with Interpretation
1.510.010, reproduced at Appendix J). Interpretation 1.510.010 provides several
examples of circumstances in which contingent fees are permitted in connection
with tax matters:
1. representing a client in an examination by a revenue agent of the client's
federal or state income tax return;
2. filing an amended federal or state income tax return claiming a tax refund
based on a tax issue that is either the subject of a test case (involving a
different taxpayer) or with respect to which the taxing authority is
developing a position;
3. filing an amended federal or state income tax return (or refund claim)
claiming a tax refund in an amount greater than the threshold for review
by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation ($2 million) or state
taxing authority;
4. requesting a refund of either overpayments of interest or penalties
charged to a client's account or deposits of taxes improperly accounted for
by the federal or state taxing authority in circumstances where the taxing
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authority has established procedures for the substantive review of such
refund requests;
5. requesting, by means of "protest" or similar document, consideration by
the state or local taxing authority of a reduction in the "assessed value" of
property under an established taxing authority review process for hearing
all taxpayer arguments relating to assessed value; and
6. representing a client in connection with obtaining a private letter ruling or
influencing the drafting of a regulation or statute.
Circular 230's rules on the use of contingent fees in tax matters are similar, but
not identical, to the AICPA rules. A contingent fee is defined for Circular 230
purposes as:
any fee that is based, in whole or in part, on whether or not a position taken
on a tax return or other filing avoids challenge by the Internal Revenue
Service or is sustained either by the Internal Revenue Service or in
litigation. A contingent fee includes a fee that is based on a percentage of
the refund reported on a return, that is based on a percentage of the taxes
saved, or that otherwise depends on the specific result attained. A
contingent fee also includes any fee arrangement in which the practitioner
will reimburse the client for all or a portion of the client's fee in the event
that a position taken on a tax return or other filing is challenged by the
Internal Revenue Service or is not sustained, whether pursuant to an
indemnity agreement, a guarantee, rescission rights, or any other arrangement with a similar effect.
Circular 230 § 10.27(c)(1). Circular 230 § 10.27(b) prohibits contingent fees for
services rendered in connection with any matter before the IRS, with four
exceptions. Thus, Circular 230 purports to prohibit practitioners from charging
contingent fees in connection with preparing or filing an original tax return,
amended tax return, or claim for refund. Restricting contingent fees in this context
is thought to discourage return positions that exploit the "audit lottery." Ridgely v.
Lew, 55 F. Supp. 3d 89, 90 (D.D.C. 2014), casts serious doubt on Treasury's authority
to regulate or limit contingent fee arrangements in these contexts. Although the
challenge in Ridgely was only to the bar on contingent fees in the preparation of
refund claims, consider whether Ridgely, when coupled with Loving (discussed in
Chapter 1 and excerpted in Chapter 2), is broad enough to effectively invalidate any
regulation of contingent fees for services rendered "before the commencement of
any adversarial proceedings with the IRS or any formal legal representation" by
the practitioner. Ridgely v. Lew, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 91.

RIDGELY v. LEW
United States District Court, District of Columbia
55 F. Supp. 3d 89 (2014)
MEMORANDUM OPINION

To prevent "exploit[ation of] the audit selection process," the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") in 2007 prohibited a broad range of tax practitioners from charging
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contingent fees for certain services relating to preparing, filing, or presenting tax
returns or refund claims. 31 C.F.R. § 10.27. Plaintiff Gerald Lee Ridgely, Jr., a
practicing CPA, brought suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of the IRS in their official capacities, arguing that the IRS exceeded
the scope of its statutory authority in regulating the preparation and filing of
"Ordinary Refund Claims"-refund claims that practitioners file after a taxpayer
has filed his original tax return but before the IRS has initiated an audit of the
return. Ridgely and the IRS cross-moved for summary judgment. Concluding that
the IRS lacks statutory authority to regulate the preparation and filing of Ordinary
Refund Claims, the Court grants Ridgely's Motion.
I. Background

AB most taxpayers know, the process of preparing, filing, and (in some cases)
adjudicating tax returns can be complicated. So before examining the merits of this
case, the Court will provide some background on how taxpayers interact with the
IRS and how the IRS treats the "Ordinary Refund Claims" at issue in this case.
A. Process for Preparing and Filing Refund Claims

Taxpayers proceed through three stages of interaction with the IRS: assessment
and collection, examination, and appeals. "ABsessment" refers to the "calculation of
a recording of a tax liability" following a taxpayer's submission of his return.
Although the IRS accepts most taxpayers' returns as filed, it selects some returns
for examination, or audit. 26 C.F.R. § 601.103(b). During the examination stage,
which may take place by mail or in-person, "a taxpayer may be represented before
the examiner by an attorney, certified public accountant, or other representative."
26 C.F.R. § 601.105(b)(1). Mter the examination, the IRS may determine that the
taxpayer owes additional tax or that the IRS owes a refund to the taxpayer. Finally,
if the taxpayer and IRS disagree over the IRS's disposition, the taxpayer may
request an in-person conference with the IRS's appeals office, during which he may
designate a representative to act on his behalf. 26 C.F.R. §§ 601.103(b), (c)(1)-(3);
601.106(c). A taxpayer may then seek review in court. 26 C.F.R. § 601.103(c).
This case concerns the preparation and filing of the so-called "Ordinary Refund
Claim," a procedure that a taxpayer may undertake if he determines that he has
overpaid his taxes. A taxpayer may file this type of claim after he has filed his tax
return or during the course of an examination, but prior to filing suit in court for a
refund. I.R.C. § 7422(a). In his claim, a taxpayer must detail the exact basis for the
refund. Treas. Reg. 301.6402-2(b)(1). Should the IRS disallow his claim, the
taxpayer may appeal. I.R.C. § 6532(a). Particularly if the refund claim is complex,
a taxpayer may elect to hire a CPA to help prepare and file his claim.
Before proceeding any further, the Court must explain exactly what actions
constitute "preparing and filing" an Ordinary Refund Claim. AB Ridgely's counsel
made clear during the hearing on the parties' summary judgment motions, a CPA
may assist a taxpayer in preparing and filing a refund claim and, in doing so, would
not be legally representing the taxpayer until the IRS responds to the claim and the
CPA submits a power:of-attorney form to the IRS. Thus, what Ridgley challenges
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here is the IRS's proclaimed authority to regulate fee arrangements entered into by
CPAs for preparing and filing Ordinary Refund Claims before the commencement of
any adversarial proceedings with the IRS or any formal legal representation by the
CPA.
B. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

This case concerns the breadth of the IRS's authority to regulate CPAs, which is
found in 31 U.S.C. § 330, a statute originally enacted in 1884. Pursuant to Section
330, the Treasury Secretary has authority to regulate "persons" who practice
before the Treasury Department. In relevant part, Section 330 states:
(a) Subject to section 500 of title 5, the Secretary of the Treasury may(1) regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury; and
(2) before admitting a representative to practice, require that the representative demonstrate-(A) good character;
(B) good reputation;
(C) necessary qualifications to enable the representative to provide to
persons valuable service; and
(D) competency to advise and assist persons in presenting their
cases.
(b) After notice and opportunity for a proceeding, the Secretary may suspend
or disbar from practice before the Department, or censure, a representative who(1) is incompetent;
(2) is disreputable;
(3) violates regulations prescribed under this section; or
(4) with intent to defraud, willfully and knowingly misleads or threatens
the person being represented or a prospective person to be represented.
(d) Nothing in this section or in any other provision oflaw shall be construed
to limit the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to impose standards
applicable to the rendering of written advice with respect to any entity,
transaction plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement, which is of
a type which the Secretary determines as having a potential for tax
avoidance or evasion.
Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Secretary of the Treasury publishes
regulations governing "practice" before the IRS in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 31, part 10. These regulations are commonly known as "Circular 230."
Most of Circular 230 outlines duties and restrictions concerning "practice" before
the IRS as they relate to practitioner character, reputation, and competency. See 31
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C.F.R. §§ 10.20-.38. The IRS has applied these regulations to attorneys, CPAs, and
other specified tax professionals. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2009). Beginning in 1994,
Circular 230 prohibited the use of contingent fee arrangements for preparing
original income tax returns, but allowed such arrangements in the context of
preparing an amended return or a claim for a refund.
In 2007, after a period of notice and comment, the IRS promulgated regulations
prohibiting the charging of contingent fees except in limited circumstances.
Specifically, Section 10.27(a)-(b) of Circular 230 provides:
(a) In general. A practitioner may not charge an unconscionable fee in
connection with any matter before the Internal Revenue Service.
(b) Contingent fees(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (b)(2), (3), and (4) of this section, a
practitioner may not charge a contingent fee for services rendered in
connection with any matter before the Internal Revenue Service.
(2) A practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in
connection with the Service's examination of, or challenge to(i) An original tax return; or
(ii) An amended return or claim for refund or credit where the
amended return or claim for refund or credit was filed within 120
days of the taxpayer receiving a written notice of the examination
of, or a written challenge to the original tax return.
(3) A practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in
connection with a claim for credit or refund filed solely in connection
with the determination of statutory interest or penalties assessed by
the Internal Revenue Service.
(4) A practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in
connection with any judicial proceeding arising under the Internal
Revenue Code.
Section 10.27 defines "matter before the Internal Revenue Service" to include "tax
planning and advice, preparing or filing or assisting in preparing or filing returns or
claims for refund or credit, and all matters connected with a presentation to the
Internal Revenue Service or any of its officers or employees relating to a taxpayer's
rights, privileges, or liabilities." Circular 230 § 10.27. The provision therefore
encompasses preparers of refund claims who "appear" before the IRS only when
they prepare and/or file refund claims. With this statutory and regulatory framework in mind, the Court now turns to the particular facts of this case.
C. Factual and Procedural History
The IRS promulgated the contingent fee restrictions at issue in this case out of
concern about auditor independence. IRS Reply [Dkt. No. 40] at 15 (arguing that
CPA practice of "taking lucrative contingent fees from companies whose books they
review . . . jeopardizes auditor independence because it leads accountants and their
clients to share financial interests"). The plaintiff in this case, Gerald Ridgely, is a
practicing CPA. Required to comply with 10.27's restrictions on contingent fee
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arrangements, Ridgely argues that he has suffered a "loss of clients and significant
revenue,'' and that his "ability to represent and assist clients in the preparation and
filing of Ordinary Refund Claims and to practice before the IRS has been severely
restricted." Seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, Ridgely sued the Secretary of
the Treasury and the Commissioner of the IRS under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2202. This Court previously determined that Ridgely has standing. Both
parties now move for summary judgment.
II. Legal Standard

* * *
The court reviews APA claims under the familiar two-step Chevron standard.
Chevron US.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984).
The court first uses the traditional tools of statutory interpretation to determine
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842, 104 S. Ct. 2778. "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." I d. at 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778. "If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." I d. at
842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778. "[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue,'' the court proceeds to step two, asking whether the agency's
interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." I d. at 843, 104
S. Ct. 2778. The agency's construction at step two is permissible "unless it is
arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Mayo
Found. forMed. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711, 178 L. Ed.
2d 588 (2011).
III. Analysis
Section 330(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to "regulate the practice
of representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury." 31 U.S.C.
§ 330(a)(1). As both parties recognize, however, Congress "nowhere defined the
meaning or scope of the term 'practice' before the Treasury Department."

* * *
This Court, however, is not the first to venture down this particular rabbit hole.
Earlier this year, in Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the D.C. Circuit
grappled with the question of ''whether the IRS's authority to 'regulate the practice
of representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury' encompasses
authority to regulate tax-return preparers,'' Loving, 742 F.3d at 1016 (emphasis
added), whom the Court in turn defined as persons who " 'prepare[] for compensation, or who employ[] one or more persons to prepare for compensation, all or a
substantial portion of any return of tax or any claim for refund of tax under the
Internal Revenue Code,'" id. (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-15(a)). The Court held
that the text, history, structure, and context of Section 330 "foreclose[d] and
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render[ed] unreasonable" the IRS's interpretation of Section 330. Id. at 1022. In
other words, the IRS's interpretation failed at both Chevron step 1 and Chevron
step 2. !d.
As the IRS is quick to point out, though, Loving involved a different set of
plaintiffs-non-CPA tax-return preparers-and different provisions of Circular
230-Sections 10.3-10.6, which imposed requirements to pay a fee, pass a qualifying
exam, and complete continuing education classes. But Loving also expressly
addressed two key questions that the Court faces here: who are "representatives"
and what is "practice" under Section 330? In the Court's view, Loving is controlling
precedent that must guide the Court's examination of Section 330's text, context,
and history with respect to the claims at issue in this case.

A. Text of Section 330

The plain text of Section 330(a) limits the regulatory authority of the Secretary
of the Treasury to "the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury." 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(l). As the Loving court explained, two
terms in this provision are key: "representative" and "practice." To fall under
Section 330's purview, the regulated conduct must be "practice" and must be
undertaken by a "representative."
As to the meaning of the term "representative," Loving is clear: a "representative" is traditionally one ''with authority to bind others." Tax-return preparers
neither "possess legal authority to act on the taxpayer's behalf' nor can they
"legally bind the taxpayer by acting on the taxpayer's behalf." They are, as a result,
"not agents." As mentioned earlier, the Loving court defined "tax return preparers"
to expressly include those preparing refund claims, but even if the court's holding
fails to directly cover CPAs preparing and filing Ordinary Refund Claims, the
court's reasoning applies straightforwardly. CPAB preparing and filing such claims
before possessing any power of attorney possesses no "legal authority to act on
behalf of taxpayers." In Loving's words, these individuals merely "assist[]" the
taxpayer. Thus, Section 330's use of the term ''representative" excludes refund claim
preparers, just as it did tax-return preparers in Loving.

Loving also sheds light on the meaning of the term "practice" in Section 330. As
the Court explained, "practice . . . before the Department of the Treasury," like
practice before any agency or court, "ordinarily refers to practice during an
investigation, adversarial hearing, or other adjudicative proceeding." The process of
filing an Ordinary Refund Claim-again, before any back-and-forth with the
IRS-is similar to the process of filing a tax return in that both take place prior to
any type of adversarial assessment of the taxpayer's liability. If a "tax-return
preparer do[es] not practice before the IRS when [he] simply assist[s] in the
preparation of someone else's tax return," then a CPA hardly "practices" before the
IRS when he simply prepares and files a taxpayer's refund claim, before being
designated as the taxpayer's representative and before the commencement of an
audit or appeal. Following Loving, the Court therefore concludes that the plain text
of Section 330 excludes preparers and filers of Ordinary Refund Claims from the
ambit of the IRS's regulatory authority.
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B. Context of Section 330
Like its plain text, Section 330's broader statutory context leads the Court to
conclude that the IRS's regulatory authority does not extend to those preparing and
filing Ordinary Refund Claims. "It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction
that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme." But heeding the IRS's interpretation of
Section 330 would "effectively gut" Congress's "carefully articulated" framework
for regulating those preparing and filing tax returns and tax refund claims. Loving,
742 F.3d at 1020. This framework includes a number of statutes that deal
particularly with individuals preparing tax returns or refund claims. To start, 26
U.S.C. § 7701 expressly defines "tax return preparer" to include individuals who
prepare tax returns or tax refund claims. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(36). Beyond grouping
tax-return preparers and tax-refund preparers in the same statutory definition,
Congress enacted a comprehensive scheme of penalties to curb the potential for
abuse in the preparation and filing of both original returns and refund claims. See
26 U.S.C. §§ 6662, 6663, 6676, 6694, 6701, 7206, and 7207 (penalizing filing frivolous
claims for refunds, inaccurate reporting, fraud, understatements due to unreasonable positions, willful or reckless conduct, aiding and abetting understatements of
tax liabilities, willfully aiding or assisting in the preparation of fraudulent or false
claims, and willfully delivering fraudulent or false returns to the IRS). These
provisions reveal that Congress conceived of tax-return preparation and tax-refund
preparation as similar activities that qualitatively differ from the "practice" of
presenting or adjudicating cases. But under the IRS's view, these specific provisions
would serve no purpose, for Section 330 itself would have given the IRS liberal
authority to impose various penalties on tax-return preparers who behave unethically. See Loving, 742 F.3d at 1020. The definition of "tax return preparer" and the
need to avoid surplusage support the conclusion that Congress differentiated
between the preparation and filing of refund claims on the one hand and their
subsequent adjudication on the other. Congress clearly intended to allow the IRS to
regulate these two categories of activity differently, and the grant of authority in
Section 330 is limited to the latter.
C. History of Section 330
The history of Section 330 also indicates that the statute's scope never encompassed the mere preparation and filing of refund claims. The original language of
Section 330 stated:
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe rules and regulations
governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing claimants before his Department, and may require of such persons,
agents and attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of
claimants, that they shall show that they are of good character and in good
repute, possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render
such claimants valuable service, and otherwise competent to advise and
assist such claimants in the presentation of their cases.
Act of July 7, 1884, ch. 334, sec. 3, 23 Stat. 258, 258-59 (emphasis added). As Loving
noted, Congress's use of "the words 'agents,' 'attorneys,' 'claimants,' 'otherwise,' and

134

TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND ADVICE

CH.3

'presentation of their cases' in the original version of the statute" and Congress's
statement "in the statute itself that it intended no change in meaning when it
streamlined the statute in 1982" demonstrates that "the statute contemplates
representation in a contested proceeding." 742 F.3d at 1020. Because a CPA
prepares and files an Ordinary Refund Claim before becoming a legal representative and presenting his case, preparing and filing such claims is not within the scope
of the actions originally targeted by Section 330.
D. IRS's Counter-Arguments
The IRS offers only one non-conclusory argument in response to the Court's
statutory interpretation as guided by Loving: that because Ridgely is a CPA, he "is
a representative who practices before the Department and is therefore subject to
the terms of Circular 230." In other words, according to the IRS, it has authority to
regulate all actions of CPAs who-at some point-"practice" before it, regardless
of ''whether they're acting in a representational or nonrepresentational capacity."
This argument, however, poses three problems. First, it is inconsistent with the use
of the word "practice" in Section 330. The statute does not regulate "practitioners"
generally; it regulates a specific kind of activity they may undertake: "practice . . .
before the [IRS]." 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1). Second, the IRS's position would read the
word "representative" out of Section 330. As Loving made clear, Section 330 only
applies to individuals when they represent taxpayers. Third, adhering to the IRS's
position would lead to absurd results. According to the IRS, it could broadly
regulate the actions of CPAs no matter what they were doing-even if their conduct
was nowhere close to "practicing" before IRS-simply because, say, the CPAs
"practiced" before the IRS once a year. Meanwhile, the IRS would impose no
contingent fee restrictions on the preparation and filing of Ordinary Refund Claims
by non-CPAs and those who never "practice" before the IRS. Nothing in the
statutory text (or, for that matter, the context and history of Section 330) gives the
IRS this kind of authority over CPAs specifically. Further, nothing in Section 10.27
indicates that the IRS was concerned with CPA conduct in particular instead of with
the ethics of fee arrangements for preparation and filing generally. The Court
therefore disagrees with the IRS that simply because CPAs may at times practice
before the IRS, the IRS has authority to regulate their conduct without limit.
The IRS's remaining arguments have been foreclosed by Loving. For example,
the IRS argues that it has "inherent authority" to regulate those that practice
before it. But as Loving held, the IRS's regulatory authority is expressly circumscribed by Section 330. The IRS also argued for the first time at the hearing that
Section 330(d) broadly authorizes the IRS to regulate those preparing and filing
Ordinary Refund Claims regardless of the capacity in which they act. But the IRS
never explained how Section 330(d), which concerns "the rendering of written
advice," encompasses preparing or filing refund claims prior to formal legal
representation. 31 U.S.C. § 330(d). If ''written advice" included such acts, it would
also include preparing and filing tax returns, a possibility foreclosed by Loving. In
any event, as the Court has explained, the plain text, context, and history of Section
330 paint a clear picture of the scope of the IRS's authority with respect to the
preparation and filing of Ordinary Refund Claims. That clarity cannot be eclipsed
by brief, thinly supported references to ambiguous statutory language, the
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relevance of which the IRS never really explains.

*

*

*

IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Ridgely's Motion for Summary
Judgment and deny the IRS's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will issue
a separate Order consistent with this Opinion.

Despite the outcome with respect to the IRS, it is worth considering whether Mr.
Ridgely nonetheless may have a problem with his state licensing board or the
AI CPA. According to court filings, Mr. Ridgely is a CPA, licensed in Texas. Thus, he
could be disciplined for violating AI CPA guidelines (AI CPA Code of Profl Conduct
ET § 1.510.001 and Interpretation 301.01) that prohibit contingent fees for preparing refund claims in most instances. (As in many states, the Texas Society of
Certified Public Accountants has incorporated the AICPA standards into its own
Code of Professional Conduct.) Moreover, because the AICPA standard explicitly
bans contingent fees for preparing original returns, that standard should deter
contingent fee arrangements as to original returns, as a general matter, regardless
of the validity of Circular 230 § 10.27 (i.e., if Ridgely were given a broad reading).
Query whether OPR will step up its referrals to the AICPA and state boards of
accountancy where contingent fees are utilized. Interestingly, attorneys may be
able to take more advantage of the Ridgely case than CPAs since the ethical rules
governing attorneys do not generally prohibit the charging of such contingent fees.
See Model Rule 1.5(c) and (d).
Circular 230 does permit contingent fee arrangements in four specific situations.10
First, a practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in
connection with an IRS examination of, or challenge to, an original tax return,
amended return, or claim for refund where the amended return or claim for refund
is filed (1) before the taxpayer receives a written notice of examination of, or a
written challenge to, the original tax return or (2) no later than 120 days after
receipt of such written notice or challenge. Contingent fees are permitted in this
situation because unlike, e.g., an original return, substantive review by the IRS of
the taxpayer's position here is a certainty. Therefore, the rule does not encourage

° Circular 230 § 10.27(b) itself permits practitioners to collect contingent fees in three specific
situations (which are discussed in the text). On March 26, 2008, the IRS issued Notice 2008-43, 2008-1
C.B. 748, adding a fourth situation in which contingent fees are permitted and announcing its intention
to amend certain language in Circular 230 § 10.27(b). Notice 2008-43 also announced a substantive
change to Circular 230 § 10.27(b)(2). Treasury began the process of amending Circular 230 § 10.27(b) to
incorporate the substance of Notice 2008-43 by issuing proposed regulations in July 2009. 74 Fed. Reg.
37183-01. The Preamble states that Notice 2008-43 will become obsolete when the regulations become
final. However, Treasury has taken no action with respect to the proposed changes. (Circular 230 itself
has been amended twice since 2008.) The text assumes that the changes announced in Notice 2008-43
have been incorporated into Circular 230. Students should make sure to consider the status of the
proposed regulations and Notice 2008-43 until such time as Circular 230 § 10.27(b) is formally amended.
1
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practitioners to encourage frivolous positions that exploit the audit lottery. The
120-day limit addresses governmental concerns over the use of contingent fee
arrangements in connection with claims for refund or amended returns that are
filed very late in the process of an examination (audit) in the hope that an IRS
officer or employee will not look closely at the claims.
Second, a practitioner is permitted to charge a contingent fee for services
rendered in connection with a claim for refund filed solely in connection with the
determination of statutory interest or penalties assessed by the IRS. This exception
is meant to address services provided by "account review practitioners" who
retroactively evaluate corporate taxpayers' IRS accounts to determine whether
they have overpaid interest or penalties. Typically, account review practitioners' fees
are based on a percentage of the savings uncovered. Because the interest or
penalties have already been paid, a claim for refund is necessary, assuring
substantive review by an IRS employee or officer.
Third, a practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in
connection with a whistleblower claim under Section 7623. 11 That section establishes a program under which the IRS may pay rewards to persons who report
underpayments of tax by others. Such persons (''whistleblowers") may be entitled
to receive a percentage of the taxes recovered by the IRS.
Fourth, a practitioner may charge a contingent fee for services rendered in
connection with any judicial proceeding arising under the Code.

PROBLEM 3-21
Lawyer has been asked by Client for advice in connection with Client's
investment in a series of financial transactions, which Client hopes will result in
substantial tax savings to Client. Among the services to be provided by Lawyer,
Lawyer will issue an opinion letter describing the tax consequences of the
investment. May Lawyer's fee reflect a portion of the projected tax savings? Would
it matter if Lawyer agreed to (perhaps retroactively) reduce her fee if the tax
savings did not hold up under audit or litigation?

B. Tax Return Accuracy Standards
Differences between the income tax return accuracy standards for taxpayers
and for the professionals who advise them could result in conflicts of interest.
Specifically, with respect to the same position on a taxpayer's return, a tax adviser
might face the imposition of a penalty if such position is not disclosed (i.e., flagged)
on the return while, at the same time, the taxpayer might face no penalty risk for
nondisclosure. In other words, it could be in the adviser's interest, but not in the
taxpayer/client's interest, to disclose a position. Thankfully, Congress significantly
reduced the potential for such conflicts by amending Section 6694 (the preparer
penalty rules) in 2008 to conform the preparer and taxpayer standards. As is
discussed in Chapter 2, the basic standard is now "substantial authority" for both
11
This category was added by Notice 2008-43. Query whether contingent fee arrangements in
connection with whistleblower claims violate the Model Rules. See discussion, infra at III.D.
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groups: return positions that are supported by substantial authority generally will
not subject anyone to penalties; positions that lack substantial authority could
subject both the taxpayer and her professional adviser to penalties unless the
positions are disclosed on the return. See Sections 6694(a)(2), 6662(d)(2)(B).
The professional standard articulated in ABA Formal Op. 85-352 differs from
the taxpayer standard. That difference creates the potential for conflicts of
interest. See ABA Section of Taxation Committee on Standards of Tax Practice,
Standards of Tax Practice Statement 2000-1, 54 TAX LAw. 185 (2000). ABA Formal
Op. 85-352 concludes that "[a] lawyer may advise reporting a position on a tax
return so long as the lawyer believes in good faith that the position is warranted in
existing law or can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law and there is some realistic possibility of
success if the matter is litigated" (the "realistic possibility of success" standard). A
"realistic possibility of success" has been quantified as a likelihood of success
approximating one-third. The realistic possibility of success standard also applies
to CPAs, but only where the applicable taxing authority has no written standards
or if its standards are lower than the AI CPA standards. See AI CPA SSTS No. 1 (in
Appendix C) & Interpretation No. 1-1, "Reporting and Disclosure Standards" (in
Appendix D). The realistic possibility of success standard is inconsistent with
Section 6694, as amended, and should be revised or withdrawn. 12 Until revision,
however, attorneys are strongly advised to follow the higher standard in Section
6694.

C. Referrals to OPR
The Internal Revenue Manual lists circumstances in which a Revenue Agent
must or may refer a practitioner to OPR. Referral is mandatory in the following

situations:
1. when cases in which understatements due to willful or reckless conduct
(Section 6694(b)) are closed;
2. when a penalty for aiding and abetting (Section 6701) is assessed (Revenue
Agents should consider referrals to OPR where the Section 6701 penalty
was considered but not imposed);
3. when a penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters (Section 6700) is
assessed against an attorney, CPA or enrolled agent;
4. when an injunctive action (Section 7407 or Section 7408) is taken against
promoters of abusive tax shelters; and
5. when injunctive action (Section 7408) is taken against an attorney, CPA or
enrolled agent.
IRM
12

~

4.11.55.4.2.2.1 (2010).

No efforts have ever been undertaken to revise ABA Formal Op. 85-352. The AICPA revised its
SSTSs effective January 1, 2010. The new standard retains the realistic possibility of success standard
but requires CPAs to follow a higher standard if one is adopted by the relevant taxing authority.
Therefore, CPAs are subject to the higher substantial authority standard in preparing federal returns.
See also AI CPA Interpretation No. 1-1, "Reporting and Disclosure Standards."
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The following situations may warrant a referral to OPR:
1. when penalties are asserted due to "unreasonable positions" (Section
6694(a)) or for failing to furnish a copy of a return to the taxpayer, failing
to sign a return, failing to furnish an identifying number (PTIN), failing to
retain a copy or list, failing to file correct information returns for tax
return preparers, negotiating taxpayer refund checks, or failing to be
diligent in determining eligibility for earned income credit (Section 6695);
2. when return preparer referrals are made to the IRS Criminal
Investigation Division (Section 7206);
3. when an appraiser who aids or assists in the preparation or presentation
of an appraisal in connection with the tax laws will be subject to
disciplinary action if the appraiser knows that the appraisal will be used in
connection with the tax laws and will result in an understatement of the
tax liability of another person;
4. when a by-pass of representative letter was issued to a tax practitioner;
5. when a practitioner engages in disreputable conduct or incompetence as
described in Circular 230 § 10.51;
6. when a tax practitioner is implicated in a frivolous tax return matter
(Section 6702);
7. when an accuracy-related penalty (Section 6662(d)) for a substantial
understatement is asserted and the facts of the case suggest the
practitioner did not exercise due diligence in the preparation of the return;
8. when an erroneous claim for refund or credit penalty (Section 6676) is
asserted becap.se there is no reasonable basis for the refund claim and the
facts suggest that the practitioner did not exercise due diligence in the
preparation of the return;
9. when a practitioner fails to comply with the tax shelter registration
requirement (Section 6111) or characterizes such registration as an IRS
endorsement of the shelter and takes a position on a tax return that
reflects the purported endorsement;
10. when opinions rendered by tax practitioners are used or referred to in the
marketing of tax shelters (abusive or otherwise); and
11. when an examination report is written with respect to any tax return of an
attorney, CPA, or enrolled agent, or a return prepared by an attorney,
CPA or enrolled agent where a Pre-filing Notification Letter was issued in
connection with a tax shelter and the loss and/or credit from the
promotion was nevertheless claimed on the tax return.
IRM 114.11.55.4.2.2.2 (2010). Some of the circumstances listed above involve acts
that are or may be outside of OPR's statutory authority, following Loving and
Ridgely. It will be interesting to see if the IRS amends the IRM. Perhaps OPR
would like to hear about the various situations nonetheless, for data gathering or
other purposes.

n.
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PROBLEM 3-22
Several years ago, Lawyer gave tax advice to a long-time client (Client) with
respect to an investment that Client was then considering. Client made the
investment. Client's income tax return for the year in which the investment was
made is now under audit by the IRS. Because Lawyer is Client's regular tax
counsel, Lawyer is representing Client in the proceeding. From comments made
by the IRS Revenue Agent during the course of discussions, Lawyer has the
impression that the Revenue Agent believes that Lawyer gave Client bad advice at
the time of the investment. What, if anything, should Lawyer do? What, if anything,
must Lawyer do?

PROBLEM 3-23
Lawyer represents Client during what Lawyer originally thought was a routine
audit. During the course of the proceeding, Lawyer realizes that the Revenue
Agent may have grounds for referring her to OPR. Is there automatically a conflict
of interest? How should Lawyer decide whether or not to withdraw from the
representation?

D. Whistleblower Claims
The IRS maintains two whistleblower programs under the authority of Section
7623. Claims involving individuals with more than $200,000 of gross income and/or
an amount in dispute in excess of $2 million are eligible for awards ranging from 15
to 30 percent of the amount collected (including additional taxes, interest,
penalties, and fines) by the IRS as a result of the whistleblower's information.
Section 7623(b). Claims that do not meet the thresholds are eligible for
discretionary awards determined by the Director of the IRS Whistleblower Office.
Section 7623(a). The possibility of collecting a bounty by blowing the whistle on
one's own client or on another party raises significant ethical issues, primarily in
(but not limited to) the area of conflicts of interest.
The following ethics opinion concerns another whistleblower program,
established by the Dodd-Frank legislation. The ethical position of lawyers wishing
to participate in the IRS whistleblower programs should be the same as that of
lawyers wishing to blow the whistle to the Securities and Exchange Commission
under Dodd-Frank, although in the latter case there is some evidence that federal
preemption of state bar ethical rules may have been intended. In reviewing the
opinion, students should be aware that New York, the jurisdiction in which the
opinion was written, has not adopted Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3) (discussed in
Chapter 4). While the confidentiality analysis might differ under the Model Rule,
the conclusion would be the same because, even under the Model Rule, disclosure
is permitted only to the extent that it is "reasonably necessary." It is difficult to
envision a circumstance in which it would be reasonably necessary within the
meaning of Model Rule 1.6 for a lawyer to pursue the steps necessary to collect a
bounty or reward for revealing confidential information. See United States u Quest
Diagnostics, 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013), aff'g, United States ex rel. Fair Lab.
Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 2011); New York ex. rel. Danon u Vanguard Group, Inc., 2015 N.Y. Misc.
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LEXIS 4239 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (dismissing whistleblower claim by attorney relying on
former employer's confidential information).

New York County Lawyers Association Formal Opinion 746
(Oct. 2013) 13
Question
May a New York lawyer ethically participate in the whistleblower bounty
program under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 by revealing confidential information about the lawyer's client and then
seeking a bounty?
Opinion
I. Introduction

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(Dodd-Frank) authorizes the payment of bounties to whistleblowers who report
corporate wrongdoing to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
Department of Justice, or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
The question arises as to the ethical implications under the New York Rules of
Professional Conduct (RPC) if a New York lawyer were to accept a whistleblower
bounty in exchange for furnishing information to the SEC or other government
agency. This opinion analyzes the duties of New York lawyers under the New York
RPC.
In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley), overwhelmingly passed by
both houses, became law. It was a response to major corporate and accounting
scandals, such as those involving Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia and WorldCom, that cost investors billions of dollars when the share prices of affected
companies collapsed. The SEC adopted Rule 205 as an attorney conduct regulation
to implement portions of Sarbanes-Oxley. Rule 205 requires lawyers and others who
deal with the SEC to report corporate misdeeds up the corporate ladder and
permits, but does not require, reporting outside the corporation if the internal
reporting does not solve the problem. 14
13
Copyright © 2013. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission of the New York County
Lawyers' Association.
14
[1] As relevant to attorneys, SEC Rule 205 provides:

An attorney appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of an
issuer may reveal to the Commission, without the issuer's consent, confidential information
related to the representation to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely to cause
substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or administrative proceeding from
committing perjury, proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1621; suborning perjury, proscribed in 18
U.S.C. 1622; or committing any act proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1001 that is likely to perpetrate
a fraud upon the Commission; or
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In an attempt to regulate the financial markets in order to prevent a recurrence
of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Dodd-Frank was signed into law on July 21,
2010. Building onto Sarbanes-Oxley, section 922 of Dodd-Frank creates a whistleblower bounty program under which individuals, who voluntarily provide original
information leading to successful SEC enforcement actions, may receive bounty
payments based on penalties assessed against respondents. 15 Whistleblowers
whose "original information" 16 results in successful prosecutions netting monetary
penalties in excess of $1 million are entitled, with some exceptions, to bounties of
10% to 30% of the amount recovered in the government enforcement actions. Thus,
the minimum whistleblower bounty is $100,000. While, as explained below, lawyers
subject to SEC jurisdiction are required to report serious corporate wrongdoing up
the corporate ladder, reporting out-and collecting a bounty-is permissible under
SEC rules. There are two sets of relevant SEC rules: attorney conduct regulations
under Rule 205 (17 C.F.R. § 205); and Rules 240 and 249 (17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249),
promulgated under Dodd-Frank, concerning whistleblowing provisions.
II. Attorneys as Whistleblowers and Bounty Seekers under SEC Rules
SEC whistleblower rules exclude from the definition of "original information"
most material that lawyers, in-house or retained, are likely to gain in the course of
their professional representation of clients, and thus generally preclude attorneys,
in most instances, from receiving a bounty for revealing such informationP SEC
Rule 21F-4(b) acknowledges the importance of the attorney-client privilege, as well
as state ethics rules, and presumptively excludes the use of privileged or confidential information from the definition of eligible original information under the
whistleblower rule. 18 Indeed, the SEC warns lawyers that there will be no financial
benefit to lawyers who disclose such information in violation of the attorney-client
privilege or their ethical requirements. 19

(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, or may
cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the
furtherance of which the attorney's services were used.
17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2).
15
[2) Bounties are also available to whistleblowers who provide original information to the CFTC and
the Department of Justice.
16
[3] "Original information" is defined at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b) as deriving from the whistleblower's "independent knowledge or independent analysis," and not available from a court or administrative
record or the news media, or otherwise known to the Commission.
17
[4] The categories excluded from whistleblower bounty include: (a) confidential communications
subject to the attorney-client privilege; (b) information that came from the legal representation of a
client, whatever its source; (c) information that came from persons in a compliance, legal, audit,
supervisory or governance role for the entity; and (d) information from the entity's legal, compliance,
audit, or related functions for dealing with violations, unless the entity did not disclose the information
to the SEC or CFTC within a reasonable time or acted in bad faith.17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4), available
at http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.21F-4.
18

[5] See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F, Exchange Act Release No.
34-64545, at 50-52, 60--66, 249-50 (Aug. 12, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-64545], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/finaV2011/34-64545.pdf.
19

[6] at 60--61, 249-50.
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However, the SEC permits attorneys to reveal information obtained as a result
of legal representation of a client when such disclosure is permitted by either state
ethics rules or SEC Rule 205.3(d)(2), which Rule, as noted above, was promulgated
under Sarbanes-O.xley. 20 Rule 205 allows attorneys practicing before the SEC in the
representation of an issuer to reveal confidential information related to the
representation when the attorney reasonably believes disclosure is necessary: (a) to
prevent the issuer from committing a material violation of securities laws that is
likely to cause substantial financial injury to the interests or property of the issuer
or investors, (b) to rectify the consequences of a material violation of securities laws
in which the attorney's services have been used, or (c) to prevent the issuer from
committing or suborning perjury in an SEC proceeding.
Under SEC Rule 205, the disclosure of client confidences outside the organization is a last resort, not a first step. The rule requires lawyers practicing before the
Commission to report evidence of material violations of the securities laws to the
company's chief legal officer (CLO), who is required to investigate the claim and
report back to the lawyer who originally made the report. 21 In the event that the
CLO finds credible evidence of a material violation, she must report the wrongdoing
up the corporate ladder, including, if necessary, to the audit committee, qualified
legal compliance committee or full board of directors. If all else fails, and if
necessary to prevent further harm to the corporation or to investors, the CLO is
authorized to disclose client confidences outside the company. 22 A junior reporting
lawyer may report disclosures outside the organization if the CLO fails to act. Thus,
under SEC Rule 205, reporting up the corporate ladder is mandatory; reporting out
is permissible. However, to the extent that there is an independent violation of the
securities laws, a lawyer may be subject to an enforcement action by the SEC for
failing to correct or prevent the wrongdoing of a client in which the lawyer was
complicit. 23
The prospect of government-rewarded lawyer whistleblowers poses two ethical
questions for New York lawyers: (1) In those limited circumstances in which the
New York Rules and SEC Rule 205 diverge, would a New York attorney violate the
RPC if she makes a disclosure not authorized by the confidentiality provisions of
RPC 1.6 in order to seek a bounty? (2) Would a New York attorney who is
representing a client violate the conflict of interest provisions of NY RPC 1.7 by
seeking a bounty as a whistleblower with respect to that client by using that client's
confidential information?
III. Disclosure of Confidential Information
In addressing the foregoing questions, the Committee begins from the obvious
premise that its jurisdiction is limited to interpreting the New York Rules of
Professional Conduct, and does not extend to the rules of other states or questions
20

[7] 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F -4(b)(4)(i), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.21F-4.

21

[8] /d. at§ 205.3(b), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/205.3.

22

[9] /d. at§ 205.3(d), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/205.3.

23

[10] See In re Don Hershman, Securities Act Release No. 33-9180 (Feb. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/33-9180.pdf.
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of substantive law. Nor can the Committee anticipate the myriad choice-of-law
issues that may arise in different contexts under RPC 8.5, particularly in matters
involving nationwide practices and administrative procedure. In addition, there are
some circumstances in which state regulations may be preempted by inconsistent
federallaw. 24 Preemption is a question of substantive law, to be applied by the
courts to the specific facts of each case, and is beyond this committee's jurisdiction.25 However, SEC whistleblower rules explicitly reference "attorney-client
privilege" and "applicable state attorney conduct rules," and thereby implicitly
assume a side-by-side coexistence of the RPC and Rule 205. 26 Moreover, the SEC
itself has acknowledged the applicability of state ethics rules in its own proceedings.27
The New York RPC prevent a lawyer generally from disclosing confidential
information, but present six categories of exceptions to the general rule in RPC
1.6(b) if the circumstances are such that "the lawyer reasonably believes [disclosure
is] necessary." Of these six exceptions, three are relevant to this discussion: RPC
1.6(b)(2), RPC 1.6(b)(3), and RPC 1.6(b)(6). [Eds. Note-New York has not adopted
Model Rules 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3), which could change the opinion's analysis on the
confidentiality issues, depending on whether the lawyer's services were used.]
RPC 1.6(b)(2) permits an attorney to disclose confidential information to prevent
a client from "committing a crime." This exception has some overlap with the
"material violation" of the securities laws described in SEC Rule 205; however, not
all securities violations rise to the level of a crime. Lawyers have been civilly or
administratively sued for registration and record-keeping violations that do not
amount to fraud or a crime. For example, in In re Isselmann, a general counsel
improperly failed to correct his client's misperception of foreign law. 28 In In re
Drummond, the SEC civilly prosecuted the general counsel of Google for failing to
24 [11] See, e.g., Giovanni P. Prezioso, Public Statement by SEC Official: Letter Regarding
Washington State Bar Association's Proposed Opinion on the Effect of the SEC's Attorney Conduct
Rules (July 23, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm.
25

[12] Compare Grievance Comm. tt Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing imposition of
discipline against attorney who violated state "no-contact" rule in federal criminal proceeding; finding
that "[i]f a particular interpretation of a state ethics rule is inconsistent with or antithetical to federal
interests, a federal court interpreting that rule must do so in a way that balances the varying federal
interests at stake"), with Gadda tt Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (state bar has authority to
discipline attorney for neglect of federal immigration matters) ('We apply a presumption against federal
preemption unless the state attempts to regulate an area in which there is a history of significant federal
regulation."), and Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. u Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (California
arbitrator ethics rules preempted in FINRA proceedings by FINRA rules approved by SEC), and
Sperry tt State of Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (IRS regulations for practice before federal agency
preempt inconsistent state rules).

26
27

[13] See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4); SEC Release No. 34-64545, supra note 5, at 50-52, 250-51.

[14] See, e.g., SEC v. Steven Altman, Securities Act Release No. 34-63306 (Nov. 10, 2010); Steven
Altman tt SEC, 666 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (disciplining lawyer for violations of NY RPC based on
extortionate conduct which impeded SEC investigation). See also 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2006) (The "McDade
Amendment") (binding federal prosecutors to follow state ethics rules to the same extent as state
lawyers); Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag, Ethical Problems in the Practice of Law 716-17 (Aspen
2008).

28

[15] Securities Act Release No. 34-50428 (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/34-50428.htm.
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report that a grant of stock options would cause the company to cross a reporting
threshold. 29 In both I sselmann and Drummond, general counsels were prosecuted
for securities law violations. However, it is at least arguable that the lawyers'
conduct in those cases, even if violations of securities law, did not rise to the level of
crime or fraud for the purpose of state ethics rules.
To the extent that SEC Rule 205 permits (but does not require) reporting out of
client confidences that amount to a material violation of the securities laws,
regardless of whether the client's conduct amounts to a crime or whether the
lawyer's services were used, it is broader than, and inconsistent with, the New York
RPC exceptions to the confidentiality requirement.
Additionally, New York RPC 1.6(b)(3) permits a lawyer to reveal client confidential information where reasonably necessary
to withdraw a written or oral opinion or representation previously given by
the lawyer and reasonably believed by the lawyer still to be relied upon by
a third person, where the lawyer has discovered that the opinion or
representation was based on materially inaccurate information or is being
used to further a crime or fraud.
This exception permits reporting out of client confidences, but only in circumstances
in which the lawyer's services have been used, in essence, to perpetrate a crime or
fraud. For example, where the lawyer participated in drafting an offering statement
that the lawyer later learns to be materially misleading, the New York Rules and
SEC Rule 205 are in essential agreement that disclosure is permissible.
The third relevant exception is New York RPC 1.6(b)(6), which permits disclosure
of client information ''when permitted or required under these Rules or to comply
with other law or court order." We do not need to decide here whether or not an
administrative regulation, such as SEC Rule 205, is a law or court order within the
meaning of the exception of RPC 1.6(b)(6). This is because RPC 1.6(b) explicitly
provides that disclosure of client confidential information under its six exceptionsincluding RPC 1.6(b)(6)-may be made only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary." The SEC regulations, as mentioned, only require reporting up
the ladder. Reporting out is permissive, not mandatory. Thus, as a general rule,
SEC Rule 205, standing by itself, does not require a lawyer to report out corporate
wrongdoing and, therefore, such reporting is not reasonably necessary within the
meaning of RPC 1.6(b). 30 The whistleblower rule is permissive as well, and does not
mandate reporting out.
Other ethics rules also inform the conduct of corporate lawyers. New York RPC
1.13, "Organization as Client," which covers the responsibilities of a corporate
attorney, requires an attorney aware of corporate misconduct that constitutes a
violation of law or of a legal duty to the corporation to take reasonable measures

29
[16] Securities Act Release No. 33-8523 (Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/33-8523.htm.
30
[17] For the same reason, the state and federal regulatory schemes are not mutually antagonistic.
SEC whistleblower regulations do not require reporting out; they permit it, within the exceptions set
forth in Rule 205. If federal regulations required reporting out, we might be in a different situation.
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within the organization to prevent harm to the organization, but does not contain
independent support for reporting outside the organization if such reporting might
result in disclosure of confidential information in violation of Rule 1.6:
If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon
action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly in violation of law and is likely to
result in a substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may reveal
confidential information only if permitted by Rule 1.6, and may resign in
accordance with Rule 1.16.31

Thus, reporting out is circumscribed under New York law to those instances
permitted in RPC 1.6(b).
In addition, in the case of known false evidence, a lawyer is required under RPC
3.3(a) to take reasonable remedial measures, "including, if necessary, disclosure to
the tribunal." Disclosing client confidences to a tribunal may also be required when
the lawyer knows of criminal or fraudulent conduct related to a proceeding in a
tribunal. 32
In sum, the New York exceptions permitting disclosure of confidential information are different from the SEC exceptions. Under the SEC rules discussed above,
an attorney may collect a bounty in exchange for disclosure of confidential
information in situations not permitted under the New York Rules. Even when
disclosure is permitted under the New York Rules, for example, when clear
corporate wrongdoing rising to the level of crime or fraud has been perpetrated
through the use of the lawyer's services, preventing wrongdoing is not the same as
collecting a bounty. Even in cases of clear criminal conduct or fraud, the lawyer's
disclosure must be limited to reasonably necessary information. 33
Ai3 a general principle, there are few circumstances, if any, in which, in the
Committee's view, it would be reasonably necessary within the meaning of RPC
1.6(b) for a lawyer to pursue the steps necessary to collect a bounty as a reward for
revealing confidential material. This point was acknowledged in a recent federal
opinion in a qui tam whistleblower case decided under the False Claims Act. 34

Thus, in those circumstances in which the New York Rules apply, this Committee
31 [18] NY RPC 1.13(c) (emphasis added). By contrast, American Bar Association Model Rule 1.13
permits outside disclosure if the corporation's board fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner
an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and if the lawyer reasonably believes that
the violation is "reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization." But disclosure is
permitted only to the extent necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
32
33

[19] NY RPC 3.3(b).

[20] See, e.g., NYSBA Comm. on Prof'! Ethics, Op. 837 (lawyer must take reasonable remedial
measures under RPC 3.3 to correct client perjury, but may only reveal client confidences to the extent
reasonably necessary; "[t]herefore, if there are any reasonable remedial measures short of disclosure,
that course must be taken").

34 [21] See United States Ex Rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., No. 05-C5393,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011) (disclosure of client confidences by former general
counsel of corporation was not "reasonably necessary" under former Code of Professional Responsibility
to rectify client fraud).
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opines that disclosure of confidential information in order to collect a whistle blower
bounty is unlikely, in most instances, to be ethically justifiable. This is because,
under most circumstances, such disclosure is not reasonably necessary, and does
not fit within the enumerated exceptions of RPC 1.6(b).35 RPC 1.6, by its terms, is
limited to "information gained during or relating to the representation of a client
. . . ." Accordingly, this opinion applies only when a lawyer is acting as a legal
representative of a client. Thus, a lawyer functioning in a non-legal capacity would
not be within the scope of this opinion.
Accordingly, New York RPC 1.6 does not permit disclosure of confidential
information in order to collect a Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty, even in
compliance with the SEC rules, if that disclosure does not fit within an exception
under New York RPC 1.6 or is not necessary to correct a fraud, crime or false
evidence within the meaning of RPC 3.3.
IV. Conflicts of Interest Under RPC 1.7
An additional and even more significant ethical issue is presented by the bounty
provisions of Dodd-Frank: Is a conflict of interest under RPC 1.7 presented when
a corporate lawyer, functioning as a lawyer, seeks to collect a whistleblower bounty?
Our answer is presumptively yes. A lawyer confronted with potential corporate
wrongdoing must evaluate and consider varying requirements under SEC and state
ethics rules and then make some difficult decisions: Is the potential violation
material? Is the potential violation criminal? Should the lawyer report the wrongdoing up the corporate ladder? Should the lawyer report the wrongdoing to an
outside body, and if so, when?

These complex and potentially inconsistent considerations call for the exercise of
objective, dispassionate professional judgment. A lawyer who blows the whistle
prematurely could harm the client and be professionally responsible for the
precipitous disclosure of client confidences. A lawyer who fails to report credible
evidence of corporate wrongdoing up the ladder, if it amounts to an independent
violation of the securities laws, could potentially be prosecuted by securities
regulators, subject to professional discipline by the SEC, and subject to reciprocal
discipline by state bar counsel. 36
Especially under these delicate circumstances, a financial incentive might tend to
cloud a lawyer's professional judgment. Yet Dodd-Frank permits the SEC to pay
lawyers potential bounties of 10%-30% of collected fines in excess of $1 million. The
potential bounties range from $100,000 to literally millions of dollars in larger cases.
The prospect of financial benefit could place the attorney's personal interests in
potential conflict with those of the client.
RPC 1.7(a)(2) precludes representation of a client, absent waiver, where a
reasonable lawyer would conclude that "there is a significant risk that the lawyer's
35

36

[22] See id.

[23] See, e.g., New York City Bar, Report of the Task Force on the Lawyer's Role in Corporate
Governance 46 (Nov. 2006) (collecting seventy-four SEC enforcement actions against lawyers), available
at http://online.wsj.com/publiclresources/documents/WSJ-CORP-GOY-FINAL_REPORT. pdf.
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professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer's
own financial, business, property or other personal interests." The prospect of a
government payment to a whistleblower poses such a risk. While we cannot
anticipate all potential circumstances and situations, and do not wish to paint a
bright line rule applicable to all cases, it is the opinion of the Committee that the
potential payment of an anticipated whistleblower bounty in excess of $100,000
presumptively gives rise to a conflict of interest between the lawyer's personal
interest and that of the client.
We cannot anticipate all potential circumstances and, therefore, our opinion
anticipates the overwhelming majority of cases in which the lawyer's professional
judgment may be affected by the prospect of a monetary bounty. This opinion is
narrowly tailored to an interpretation of permissive whistleblowing, and does not
purport to address the rare and exceptional situation in which the lawyer is
affirmatively required by law or the rules of professional conduct to report out the
client's misconduct, i.e., when reporting out is mandatory. 37 Under those rare
circumstances (in which reporting out is mandatory), the financial incentive could be
less of a factor in determining the existence of a conflict with the lawyer's personal
interest.
Further, although Rule 1.7(b) provides for a waiver by a client of the conflict even
if there is a "significant risk" that the lawyer's professional judgment or represen-

tation will be adversely affected by the lawyer's personal interest, in some
circumstances the whistleblower-bounty conflict may be unwaivable. 38
Indeed, where an attorney can hope to claim close to a $10 million bounty by
reporting a securities fraud of $30 million or more-the same amount that gave rise
to an unwaivable conflict in Schwarz-the conflict may be unwaivable. Such large
sums of money would tend to cloud lawyers' professional judgment, influencing
lawyers to report out a violation regardless of their clients' interests. 39
V. Former Clients

In our view, some ethical concerns with regard to whistleblower bounties apply
to former clients as well. New York RPC 1.9(c) prohibits a lawyer from using client
confidential information to the detriment of a former client, unless permitted by
Rule 1.6(b). According to RPC 1.9(c):
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:

37

[24] See, e.g., NY RPC 3.3(b).

38

[25] See, e.g., United States tt Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 95 (2d Cir. 2002) (unwaivable conflict of interest
raised by criminal defense lawyer's $10 million contract with police union where lawyer failed to point
finger at union delegates in defense of criminal defendant accused of participating in torture of Abner
Louima).
39
[26] This opinion does not deal with circumstances where the attorney's financial interest is less
than $100,000, and is not meant to suggest that no ethical concerns are present in such situations.
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(1) use confidential information of the former client protected by Rule
1.6 to the disadvantage of the former client, except as these Rules
would permit or require with respect to a current client or when the
information has become generally known; or
(2) reveal confidential information of the former client protected by
Rule 1.6 except as these Rules would permit or require with respect
to a current client.
Thus, Rule 1.9 protects the confidences of former clients, which may not be
disclosed to the client's detriment unless pursuant to an exception under RPC
1.6(b). And, as mentioned, the exceptions in Rule 1.6(b) permit disclosure of client
confidences only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . ." The
lawyer's duty to maintain client confidences has been held to survive the termination
of the client-lawyer relationship. 40 It is the Committee's view that lawyers of former
clients, even those wrongfully discharged in violation of the law, may not seek
bounties, although it has ·been held that they may, under some circumstances, reveal
some client confidences in the context of a claim for wrongful termination. 41 This is
because the confidentiality provisions of RPC 1.9, which apply to former clients,
incorporate those of RPC 1.6. Accordingly, a former lawyer for a client may not
reveal information that could not have been revealed in the course of the
representation.
Moreover, case law has recognized, more generally, the lawyer's duty not to harm
a former client. In Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, the California Supreme
Court sustained a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a lawyer who was disloyal
to a former client when he publicly protested a development permit that he himself
had formerly obtained on behalf of the client, at considerable expense. 42 The
lawyer's interest in free speech did not permit his act of disloyalty to his former
client regarding the same matter for which he had been retained.
We believe that a similar analysis applies in the case of a lawyer standing to profit
from blowing the whistle on a former client in exchange for a monetary bounty.
While in some circumstances a lawyer may be required to take remedial action to
prevent or correct client fraud or perjury, such actions should be taken because they
are required by the law or the RPC-not because the lawyer seeks personal gain at
the former client's expense. Additionally, we believe that attorneys owe a fiduciary
duty to former clients to maintain confidentiality, and may not violate that fiduciary
duty in order to promote a personal interest. 43 Furthermore, there are circumstances in which an attorney may be permitted under Rule 1.9 to reveal otherwise
confidential information about a former client-for example, when the disclosure is
reasonably necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime under Rule 1.6.
40
[27] See Quest DiD{Jnostics, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014; Swidler & Berlin u United States, 524
U.S. 399 (1998) (notes of Vincent Foster's lawyer are confidential even after his death).

41

[28] See, e.g., VanAsdale u Int'l Game Tech., 577 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009).

42

[29] 51 Cal. 4th 811 (2011).

43

See generally Birnbaum u Birnbaum, 73 N.Y.2d 461 (1989) (general duty of fidelity requires
avoidance of situations in which personal interests conflict with the interests of those owed a fiduciary
duty).
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However, we believe that undertaking this otherwise permissible disclosure in a
manner that results in a bounty for the attorney raises a significant risk that the
attorney's judgment in determining whether disclosure is "reasonably necessary"
will be adversely affected and presents a conflict of interest that is beyond what
Rule 1.9 was intended to allow.
VI. The Attorney's Status
While the RPC apply with equal force to lawyers in private practice and in-house
counsel, we note that the conflict provisions of RPC 1.7 (and, as mentioned above,
RPC 1.6) do not apply to all lawyers at all times, but only to lawyers who are
engaging or have engaged in the representation of a client. RPC 1.7(a) specifically
says that "a lawyer shall not represent a client" if the lawyer's professional
judgment "on behalf of a client" would be affected by a personal interest of the
lawyer. Thus, our opinion would not affect or apply to lawyers who are not
representing, or did not represent clients. For example, a corporate officer or
compliance officer who happens to be a lawyer may not necessarily be representing
a client in the performance of his duties, depending on the facts of the individual
case. To the extent that the lawyer is not representing a client, our opinion would
not apply to that conduct simply because the lawyer happens to be a licensed
attorney.
VII. Conclusion
It is the Committee's opinion that New York lawyers who are acting as attorneys
on behalf of clients presumptively may not ethically serve as whistleblowers for a
bounty against their clients under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, because doing so generally gives rise to a conflict
between the lawyers' interests and those of their clients. New York lawyers, in
matters governed by the New York RPC, may not disclose confidential information
under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower regulations, except to the extent permissible
under the Rules of Professional Conduct. This conclusion is the same for current
and former lawyers, whether in-house or outside counsel. However, this Opinion is
limited to New York lawyers who are acting as attorneys on behalf of clients.

PROBLEM 3-24
Lucy Lawyer regularly assists US persons who own offshore financial accounts
to regularize their US reporting and tax obligations. Lucy routinely discusses with
these clients the substantial penalties they may face for failing to report income on
their tax returns and for failing to report the existence of the accounts on IRS
Form 8938 and FinCEN Form 114 (Report Of Foreign Bank And Financial
Accounts; referred to as an FBAR). (Willful failure to report an account on an
FBAR could result in a penalty of up to 50 percent of the account balance per
year!) Some of these clients decide to participate in the IRS's Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Program under Lucy's guidance, while others choose to pursue other
approaches. Several wealthy clients with whom Lucy has worked suddenly stop
calling Lucy or otherwise indicate that they have decided not to report their
foreign accounts to the IRS.
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a. Can Lucy contact the IRS Whistleblower Office to report her clients'
noncompliance?
b. Can Lucy contact the IRS Whistleblower Office to report the names of the
banks in which her clients have held their unreported accounts? (The IRS and
Department of Justice might be interested in determining whether these banks
assisted US accountholders to evade their US tax obligations.)

III. OPINION LETTERS AND WRITTEN ADVICE
Circular 230 §§ 10.22 and 10.37
Model Rule 2.3
AICPA SSTS No.1, AICPA SSTS No.7, and Interpretation No. 1-2 "Tax Planning" (Appendices C and D)

A. Opinion Letters
Clients frequently ask their tax advisors for written opinion letters stating the
lawyers' or accountants' views on the tax treatment or consequences of transactions
or investments described in the letters. The letters typically begin with a detailed
description of the transaction or investment with respect to which opinions are
rendered (these are the facts on which the opinions are based), continue with a
statement of the relevant legal principles and authorities and an analysis of how
those principles and authorities apply to the facts at issue, and conclude by stating
opinions on the tax treatment or consequences. For a variety of reasons, many of
which are discussed in this section, opinion letters usually contain a variety of
embellishments, as well, e.g., the identity of the person or persons from whom the
facts were obtained, the extent to which an opinion relies on representations of
others, etc.
Tax opinion letters can be useful in a variety of circumstances. 44 Sometimes, a
client merely seeks written comfort that her advisors have thought carefully

44
According to a recent article, clients are increasingly seeking tax opinion letters for several
reasons.

First, the economy is climbing out of the 2008 depression at an accelerating pace,
prompting more deals. Second, the Jist of no-rule issues in Rev. Proc. 2014-3 continues to grow
in response to IRS resource constraints. Third, the revised Circular 230 relieves tax advice of
some constraints. Fourth, since the advent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, having a tax
opinion from someone other than your financial auditor has become more useful, even for
corporate group internal transactions. Fifth, many corporate taxpayers have become more at
ease with proceeding on opinions of tax practitioners without rulings, particularly in
reorganizations and spinoffs.
The last factor is influenced by many considerations, including (1) having no other choice,
because the IRS will not rule; (2) the declining number of IRS attacks on what can appear to
be real business deals, as contrasted with perceived "tax shelters"; and (3) the replacement of
concerns about IRS audits with concerns about the views of the company's external auditors
on financial accounting reserves and internal concerns about reporting uncertain tax positions
to the IRS.
Jasper L. Cummings, Taa; Opinion Practice Today, 145 TAX NarEs 1049 (2014).
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through the relevant issues and have confidence in their advice. With the adoption
and implementation of FASB FIN 48, 45 tax lawyers can anticipate being asked for
written opinions to influence auditors in creating tax accruals. Clients seek opinion
letters as a means of defending against the possible imposition of tax penalties by
the IRS; such opinion letters are casually referred to as "penalty protection." Some
clients seek tax opinions in order to influence others to participate or invest in a
transaction. Finally, sometimes opinions are required by law. For example, federal
securities laws may require that transactions involving issuance of securities to the
public include an opinion to support discussions of tax consequences included in the
offering materials.
Tax opinion letters predict the likelihood of a position being sustained on its
merits if challenged by the IRS. In other words, they predict how a court would
rule if called upon to decide the issue or issues opined upon, assuming that the
court were familiar with all of the relevant facts. In reality, the likelihood of any
particular outcome is difficult to quantify; nonetheless, clients ask for, and receive,
greater or lesser degrees of assurance depending on the purpose or context of the
letter. Although there are neither formal definitions of relevant terminology nor
any real agreement on the strength of the various levels, tax opinion letters
typically give assurance at one of five levels. 46

1. Reasonable basis has been quantified by some to be as low as 5 percent and by
others as high as the 20 to 25 percent range. According to Treas. Reg. § 1.66623(b)(3):
The reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is
merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim. If a return position is
reasonably based on one or more of the authorities set forth in the
[substantial authority regulations,] the return position will generally satisfy
the reasonable basis standard even though it may not satisfy the substantial authority standard.
A position having a reasonable basis avoids a negligence penalty. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-3(b)(l). Moreover, a return position must have at least a reasonable basis

in order to avoid, through disclosure,47 a penalty for substantial understatement of

45
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation (FIN) No. 48, '~ccounting for
Uncertainty in Income Taxes." For tax years beginning after December 15, 2006 (with some exceptions),
FIN 48 governs the evaluation by CPAs of material positions taken in any income tax return, for
purposes of financial accounting. According to the FASB:

[FIN 48] clarifies the accounting for uncertainty in income taxes recognized in an enterprise's
financial statements in accordance with FASB Statement No. 109, Accounting for Income
Taxes. This Interpretation prescribes a recognition threshold and measurement attribute for
the financial statement recognition and measurement of a tax position taken or expected to be
taken in a tax return.
The full text of FIN 48 is available at http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?
cid = 1175801627860&acceptedDisclaimer=true.
46

There could be other standards for opinions, e.g., "not frivolous." The text addresses only the
standards that are most commonly utilized. For a tongue-in-cheek breakdown of tax opinion standards,
see A Detailed Guide to Tax Opinion Standards, 106 TAX NarEs 1469-71 (2005).
47

Form 8275 is attached to a return whenever a taxpayer or tax return preparer wishes to disclose

152

TRANSACTIONAL PLANNING AND ADVICE

CH.3

income tax or a preparer penalty under Section 6694(a). Sections 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii),
6694(a)(2)(B).
2. Substantial authority is difficult to quantify numerically but it certainly may be
less than 50 percent. "Substantial authority" is more stringent than the reasonable
basis standard but less stringent than the more likely than not (i.e., greater than 50
percent) standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2).
There is substantial authority for the tax treatment of any item only if the
weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is substantial in relation
to the weight of authorities supporting contrary treatment. All authorities
relevant to the tax treatment of an item, including the authorities contrary
to the treatment, are taken into account in determining whether substantial
authority exists. The weight of authorities is determined in light of the
pertinent facts and circumstances in the manner prescribed in [Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii)].
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i). (Students should be quite comfortable with the
meaning of "substantial authority" after having studied Chapter 2 of this text.)
Because this standard can be satisfied at less than 50 percent certainty, it is
possible that there could be substantial authority for more than one position.
Moreover, unlike any of the other levels of assurance, substantial authority is not
stated in the regulations in terms of how likely a particular outcome will be but
focuses instead on the strength, or relative strength, of the authority or authorities
supporting a position.
An undisclosed position must have substantial authority in order to avoid the
taxpayer penalty for substantial understatement of income tax or the preparer
penalty for an unreasonable position under Section 6694(a). 48 Sections
6662(d)(2)(B)(i), 6694(a)(2)(A).

3. More likely than not means having a greater than 50 percent likelihood of
being sustained on the merits. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B), 1.6694-2(b)(l).49
For tax years beginning after December 15, 2006 (with some exceptions), "more
likely than not" is the standard or threshold that must be used by CPAs preparing
financial statements to assess all material positions taken in an enterprise's income
tax return. 5° FIN 48 requires a company to undertake and retain a detailed analysis
of tax positions that may be uncertain and to document whether each such position
items or positions in order to avoid certain penalties. Form 8275 is filed, for example, to avoid the
portions of the accuracy-related penalty due to disregard of rules or to a substantial understatement of
income tax for nontax shelter items if the return position has a reasonable basis. It can also be used for
disclosures relating to preparer penalties for understatements due to unreasonable positions or
disregard of rules. (Where disclosure is made of return positions that are contrary to a regulation, Form
8275-R is used.)
48

In addition, substantial authority is required in order to qualify for the reasonable cause exception

to the penalty for reportable transaction understatements. Section 6664(d)(2)(B).
49

A position must meet the more likely that not standard to avoid certain penalties related to tax
shelters and reportable transactions. Sections 6664(d)(3)(C), 6694(a)(2)(C).
50
The "more likely than not" threshold, for FIN 48 purposes, means that: (1) a benefit related to an
uncertain tax position may not be recognized in financial statements unless it is "more likely than not"
that the position will be sustained based on its technical merits; and (2) there must be more than a 50
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can be recognized as more likely than not. While tax opinions are not required to
meet the FIN 48 threshold, companies routinely engage outside tax counsel or
advisers to prepare tax opinions on significant positions to determine whether such
positions meet the "more likely than not" standard.
4. Should is not quantified or defined in either the Code or the regulations, but
is generally considered to mean a likelihood of success of more than 70 percent.
Thus, a "should" opinion opines at a level greater than "more likely than not" but
less than ''will." Although some attorneys use the phrases ''weak should" and
"strong should" to describe the strength of their opinions, such terminology rarely
is reflected in the opinion letters themselves. Because the level of "should" is
uncertain, these letters typically include reasoning or analysis so that the reader
can assess the degree of certainty or uncertainty for herself. (Not surprisingly, an
opinion letter that includes a lengthy analysis is referred to as a "reasoned
opinion.").
5. Will means 95 to 100 percent. A ''will" opinion is considered a "clean" or
"unqualified" opinion of near certainty. ''Will" opinions may be subject to exceptions, limitations, and/or assumptions, so long as they are customary and are stated
in the letter.

B. Ethical Considerations
1. Ethical Rules
In drafting an opinion, lawyers must be mindfUl of traditional ethical standards.
For example, under ABA Formal Op. 85-352, a lawyer is prohibited from advising
tax return positions that fall short of a "realistic possibility of success" standard.
The same standard is generally thought to govern any tax advice given to a client
to the extent that tax return positions are or will be involved (e.g., advice in the
course of structuring transactions that will involve tax return positions), including
tax advice in the course of preparing legal documents. Opinion 85-352 states:
[A] lawyer, in representing a client in the course of the preparation of the
client's tax return, may advise the statement of positions most favorable to
the client if the lawyer has a good faith belief that those positions are
warranted in existing law or can be supported by a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer can have a
good faith belief in this context even if the lawyer believes the client's
position probably will not prevail. However, good faith requires that there
be some realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated.

* * *
Thus, where a lawyer has a good faith belief in the validity of a position in
accordance with the standard stated above that a particular transaction
does not result in taxable income or that certain expenditures are properly
deductible as expenses, the lawyer has no duty to require as a condition of
percent likelihood that the position would be sustained if challenged and considered by the highest court
in the relevant jurisdiction.
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his or her continued representation that riders be attached to the client's
tax return explaining the circumstances surrounding the transaction or the
expenditures.
In the role of advisor, the lawyer should counsel the client as to whether the
position is likely to be sustained by a court if challenged by the IRS, as well
as of the potential penalty consequences to the client if the position is taken
on the tax return without disclosure. Section 6661 [now Section 6662] of the
Internal Revenue Code imposes a penalty for substantial understatement
of tax liability which can be avoided if the facts are adequately disclosed or
if there is or was substantial authority for the position taken by the
taxpayer. Competent representation of the client would require the lawyer
to advise the client fully as to whether there is or was substantial authority
for the position taken in the tax return. If the lawyer is unable to conclude
that the position is supported by substantial authority, the lawyer should
advise the client of the penalty the client may suffer and of the opportunity
to avoid such penalty by adequately disclosing the facts in the return or in
a statement attached to the return. If after receiving such advice the client
decides to risk the penalty by making no disclosure and to take the position
initially advised by the lawyer in accordance with the standard stated
above, the lawyer has met his or her ethical responsibility with respect to
the advice.
In all cases, however, with regard both to the preparation of returns and
negotiating administrative settlements, the lawyer is under a duty not to
mislead the Internal Revenue Service deliberately, either by misstatements
or by silence or by permitting the client to mislead.
In summary, a lawyer may advise reporting a position on a return even
where the lawyer believes the position probably will not prevail, there is no
'substantial authority' in support of the position, and there will be no
disclosure of the position in the return. However, the position to be asserted
must be one which the lawyer in good faith believes is warranted in existing
law or can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law. This requires that there is some
realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated. In addition, in his
role as advisor, the lawyer should refer to potential penalties and other
legal consequences should the client take the position advised.
The realistic possibility of success standard has been quantified as a one in three,
or greater, likelihood of being sustained on the merits. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1)
(as in effect prior to Dec. 15, 2008); Circular 230 § 10.34(d)(1) (as in effect prior to
Apr. 4, 2008). Prior to 2008, Circular 230 mandated the same realistic possibility of
success standard with respect to tax return positions, and the preparer penalty rule
under Section 6694(a) incorporated that standard, as well. The AI CPA rule was the
same. Thus, all tax professionals were governed by the same reporting standards in
all contexts. (The tax professional was governed by a different reporting standard
than her client, however-realistic possibility of success versus substantial
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authority. 51 )
In 2008, Section 6694(a) was amended to require that, with respect to tax advice,
a return preparer must meet the substantial authority standard (as described in
Chapter 2). The realistic possibility of success standard was replaced in Circular 230
§ 10.34(a) with a reference to Section 6694(a) (the substantial authority standard).
Therefore, while the tax practitioner's statutory reporting (i.e., penalty) standard
and her obligations under Circular 230 now conform to the client's, all three are now
subject to the substantial authority standard for nondisclosed items. Oddly, the
attorney's ethical standard is inconsistent with all of the others. ABA Formal Op.
85-352 has not been revised to reflect the incongruities and no efforts are underway
to make the appropriate revisions or to withdraw the Opinion. Most attorneys, thus,
take the ethical standard set forth in Opinion 85-352 into account but regard the
substantial authority standard as the governing standard.
Opinion letters that may be used or relied upon by third parties (other than the
client), e.g., prospective investors in a transaction organized and promoted by a
client, must comport with Model Rule 2.3, under which (1) the rendering lawyer
must reasonably believe that making an evaluation for the benefit of third parties is
compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's relationship with the client and (2) if
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect
the client's interests materially and adversely, the lawyer may not provide the
evaluation unless the client gives informed consent. According to the Comments to
Model Rule 2.3, when a question about the legal situation of a client arises at the
instance of the client's financial auditor, the lawyer's response may be made in
accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession, such as the so-called
"treaty" entered into between the ABA and AICPA. See ABA Comm. on Audit
Inquiry Responses, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, 31 Bus. LAw. 1709 (1975). The ABKs position paper
on responding to auditor responses in light of FIN 48 is available at http://apps.
americanbar.org!buslaw/trib~/materials/20081017000000.pdf.

2. AICPA Standards
According to the AICPA SSTSs and interpretations (Appendices C and D), the
same standard that applies to tax return preparation applies to professional
services involving tax planning. Interpretation No. 1-2 to SSTS No. 1. Tax planning,
for this purpose, includes any oral or written recommendation or expression of an
opinion in a prospective or completed transaction on either a return position or on
a specific tax plan by the member, the taxpayer, or a third party.
Under a prior AICPA standard, a member could not recommend that a tax
return or tax planning position be taken unless the member had a good faith belief
that the position had a realistic possibility of being sustained administratively or
judicially on its merits if challenged. That standard was revised in light of Section

51
Ethical issues arising out of this conflict were addressed by the ABA Section of Taxation
Committee on Standards of Tax Practice in its Standards of Tax Practice Statement 2001-1 (Dec. 4, 2000),
54 TAX LAw. 185 (2000), which explores whether the benefits of adequately disclosing return positions,
which might have affected taxpayers and advisers differently, generated conflicts of interest.
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6694(a) and Circular 230. The current standard retains the realistic possibility of
success standard in situations where the applicable taxing authority has no written
standards or where such written standards are lower than realistic possibility of
success. Otherwise, members are required to comply with standards imposed by
the applicable taxing authority. Thus, in the case of a federal tax issue, the
substantial authority standard (as set forth in Section 6694 and Circular 230
§ 10.34(a)) governs.
Interpretation No. 1-2 provides guidelines for issuing opinions and for reviewing
opinions given to a client by other tax professionals. In issuing a tax opinion, a
member should:
1. establish the relevant background facts;

2. consider the reasonableness of assumptions and representations;
3. consider applicable regulations and standards regarding reliance on information and advice received from a third party;
4. apply the relevant authorities to the facts;
5. consider the business purpose and economic substance of the transaction if
they are relevant to the tax consequences of the transaction (relying on a
representation that there is a business purpose or economic substance is
generally insufficient);
6.

consider whether the issue involves a listed transaction or reportable
transaction (defined in Section 6707A);

7. consider other regulations and standards applicable to written tax advice
promulgated by the applicable taxing authority; and
8. arrive at a conclusion supported by the authorities.
Interpretation No. 1-2 sets forth similar standards for members who are evaluating
tax opinions that a client has obtained from another tax advisor. These guidelines
are strikingly similar to the Circular 230 opinion standards that are described in the
next section and were replaced in 2014. It will be interesting to see if the AI CPA
retains the standards in Interpretation No. 1-2, which are now substantially stricter
than those required by Circular 230, or amends them to conform to the new Circular
230 rules.

C. Circular 230
In 2004, Treasury issued regulations prescribing opinion standards and rules
that were aimed primarily at opinions rendered in tax shelter transactions. The
regulations, however, were written broadly enough to cover other types of written
opinions and advice, as well. Indeed, much written advice, including electronic
communications, was covered by the regulations, with the result that even
innocuous e-mails covering tax topics were often thought to be covered by the
regulations. The regulations effectively required that "covered opinions" be given
in the form of reasoned opinions containing lengthy recitals of facts and
assumptions. Practitioners could avoid these cumbersome (and often costly)
requirements by disclaiming that the advice could be relied upon for certain
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purposes. 5 2 Written advice that was not subject to these onerous "covered opinion"
rules was subject to a vaguely worded version of Circular 230 § 10.37, covering
"other written advice." Neither 2004 Circular 230 § 10.35 nor Circular 230 § 10.37
was ever used by OPR for disciplinary purposes.
The onerous rules governing written opini~Jns were eliminated in 2014. In their
place, Treasury adopted a reasonable practitioner standard, which by its terms
applies to all written advice. See Circular 230 § 10.37. At the same time, Treasury
broadened the scope of procedures required of all tax practitioner firms and their
managerial and supervisory personnel to ensure compliance with Circular 230
generally and with respect to written advice. See Circular 230 § 10.36.
Under the current written advice rules, a practitioner who renders any sort of
written advice must:
1. base the written advice on reasonable factual or legal assumptions,
including assumptions as to future events;
2. reasonably consider all relevant facts and circumstances that the
practitioner knows or reasonably should know;
3. use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts relevant to the
written advice on each federal tax matter;
4. not rely on representations, statements, findings or agreements (including
projections, financial forecasts or appraisals) of the taxpayer or any other
person if reliance on them would be unreasonable;
5. relate applicable law and authorities to facts; and
6. not, in evaluating a federal tax issue, take into account the possibility that
a tax return will not be audited or that an issue will not be raised on audit.
Circular 230 § 10.37(a)(2). These requirements are essentially procedural.
Practitioners are permitted to give written advice regardless of whether the
practitioner concludes that any particular issue will be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer and regardless of the confidence level the practitioner has with respect to
any particular issue's resolution. 53 It seems clear under general ethical principles,
however, that a practitioner's reservations about the strength of her advice should
be communicated to the client. Furthermore, Circular 230 § 10.35 requires a
practitioner to possess the necessary competence to engage in practice before the
IRS. An incompetent practitioner's failure to reach a reasonable result despite
following the section 10.37 process could, then, result in OPR discipline for a
violation of section 10.35.
In evaluating whether a practitioner has failed to comply with Circular 230
§ 10.37, OPR will apply a reasonable practitioner standard, considering all facts
52

This explains the ubiquitous Circular 230 disclaimers that were prominent at the end of e-mails
sent from many law and accounting firms. For example: "Any statements regarding federal tax law
contained herein are not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purposes of avoiding
penalties that may be imposed under federal tax law or to market any entity, investment plan, or
arrangement."
53

The Sykes case, in Chapter 1, illustrates how limited the regulation's approach can be in regulating
practitioners who provide overly aggressive advice
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and circumstances, including the scope of the engagement and the type and
specificity of the advice sought by the client. A reasonable practitioner standard
also will apply in the case of an opinion which the practitioner knows or has reason
to know will be used or referred to by a person other than the practitioner in
promoting, marketing, or recommending to others an entity, plan, or arrangement
with a significant tax avoidance or evasion purpose, but in this case, any review will
emphasize the additional risk caused by the practitioner's lack of knowledge of the
taxpayer's particular circumstances.

